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The “Death of Environmentalism” Debates:  Forging Links between SEA and Civil Society 
Discourses 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Social and environmental accounting (SEA) is currently going through a period of critical self-
analysis.  Challenging questions are being raised about how SEA should be defined, who should 
be doing the defining, and what the agenda should be.  We attempt to engage and enrich these 
debates from both a process and content perspective by drawing on the political philosophy of 
agonistic pluralism and a set of debates within the environmental movement – “the death of 
environmentalism” debates. The contribution of the paper is twofold:  to set forth the death of 
environmentalism debates in the accounting literature and, in doing so, to contextualize and 
theorize the contested nature of SEA using agonistic pluralism.  In contrast to consensually-
oriented approaches to SEA, the desired outcome is not necessarily resolution of ideological 
differences but to imagine, develop, and support democratic processes wherein these differences 
can be recognized and engaged.  We construe the “Death” debates as illustrative of the 
contestable practical and political issues facing both SEA and progressive social movements 
generally, demonstrating the context and content of the deliberations necessary in contemplating 
effective programs of engagement.  The SEA community, and civil society groups, can benefit 
from the more overtly political perspective provided by agonistic pluralism.  By surfacing and 
engaging with various antagonisms in this wider contested civic sphere, SEA can more 
effectively respond to, and move beyond, traditional politically conservative, managerialist 
approaches to sustainability.   
 
Key words: agonistic pluralism, death of environmentalism, social and environmental 
accounting, polylogic/dialogic accounting  
3 
 
The “Death of Environmentalism” debates:  forging links between SEA and civil society 
discourses 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, many have raised challenging questions about social and environmental 
accounting (SEA) research and practice.
1
  A, if not the, critical issue concerns the praxis of SEA 
as reflected in the debates surrounding engagement.
2
  As Bebbington et al. (2007b, p. 358) 
observe, “there are disagreements about what work needs doing, who to work with in order to 
achieve change, and how engagements (if they are to be undertaken) should be conducted”.  
Some take a more “technical/professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing 
tools, models, and metrics for use by business and policymakers.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, others
3
 advocate an overtly political approach along the lines of a social movement 
and/or engagement focused on (re)empowering the public sphere.  
 The activities engaged in by many of those who identify themselves with “SEA projects” 
have been largely technical, developing new decision-making models and performance reports 
sometimes in partnership with government and business organizations.
4
  Politics, if 
acknowledged at all, are generally consensual.  These initiatives, while important in taking SEA 
outside the academy, have encountered significant challenges in terms of promoting far-reaching 
change in organizational and social practices.
5
  The write-ups of these collaborative experiments 
                                                 
1
 See Bebbington et al. (2007a,b); Brown (2009); Cooper et al. (2005); Dillard and Brown (2012); Dillard and 
Roslender (2011); Everett (2004, 2007); Everett and Neu (2000); Gray (2002a, 2007, 2010); Gray et al. (2009); 
Lehman (2001, 2010); Neu et al. (2001); Owen (2008); Parker (2005); Shenkin and Coulson (2007); Spence (2009); 
Spence et al. (2010); Tinker and Gray (2003). 
2
 See Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007); Bebbington et al. (2007a,b); Burritt and Schaltegger (2010); Cooper et 
al. (2005); Gray (2002a); Lehman (2010); Owen (2008); Parker (2005); Shenkin and Coulson (2007); Spence 
(2009). 
3
 See Archel et al. (2011); Cooper et al. (2005); Lehman (2010); Neu et al. (2001); Shenkin and Coulson (2007); 
Spence (2009); Spence et al. (2010); Tinker et al. (1991). 
4
  See Adams and McNicholas (2007); Bebbington (2007); Gray and Bebbington (2001); Perez et al. (2007); Burritt 
and Schaltegger (2010). 
5
 For example, see Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, pp. 337-39) for discussion of concerns regarding 
“managerial capture” and Archel et al. (2011) for an example of capture within a policy setting context. 
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generally close with a call for patience, arguing that social change is necessarily slow and 
incremental (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2007b, p. 369; Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010, p. 843).  
Apparent “failures” and “disappointments” in SEA interventions are often attributed to factors 
such as institutional inertia, communication lapses, lack of knowledge of “best practice” 
reporting and/or a lack of time and resources.
6
  Scholars at the critical end of the spectrum, by 
contrast, view win-win approaches as politically naive and favour a more adversarial approach 
linked to contemporary social struggles and social movements.
7
  Faced with its perceived 
inability to achieve progressive social change, some commentators are calling for the “end of 
SEA” as we know it.   Recent calls for the “renewal” of SEA range from concerns such as those 
expressed by Gray et al. (2009, p. 545) that “social accounting is losing its energy and 
revolutionary zeal” and Owen (2008, p. 254) lamenting that “the apparent failure of SEA 
research to influence practice does raise serious questions as to whether our efforts amount to 
nothing more than ‘chronicles of wasted time’”, through to Spence et al.’s (2010) pleas for the 
jettisoning of SEA’s current “cargo” (including key concepts such as accountability).8  These 
contending perspectives have a lengthy pedigree in both the SEA and critical accounting 
literatures.   
 While the debates within and across different constituencies in SEA are not new, they still 
tend to be somewhat inward-looking and limited in terms of the wider dialogues to which they 
connect.  In particular, little explicit attention has been given to various progressive communities 
(e.g. civil rights, labour, feminist, gay and lesbian, and green movements) that have long 
grappled with similar issues.
9
  Scholarship and praxis in these communities draw from extensive 
experience with social change initiatives.  As such, they offer potential insights into linking the 
                                                 
6
 See Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007); Adams and McNicholas (2007); see also Aras and Crowther (2009, p. 
286) pointing to SEA as a natural process of maturation as firms “understand the benefits of greater disclosure”. 
7
 See Cooper et al. (2005); Carter and Toms (2010); Hanlon (2010); Neu et al. (2001); Shenkin and Coulson (2007); 
Spence (2009); Spence et al. (2010); Tinker et al. (1991); Tinker and Gray (2003). 
8
 Indeed, in relying on politically conservative theories such as legitimacy and stakeholder theory, Spence et al. 
(2010) query whether SEA ever really displayed “revolutionary zeal”.   
9
 This point is noted, but not developed, in Bebbington et al. (2007b, p. 358).   
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democratizing potential of broader social movements with SEA.
10
  Because of its close 
relationship with SEA, the larger environmental movement provides an obvious area to consider.  
In the following discussion, we focus on Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004; 2005a,b; 2007) 
proclamations of the “death of environmentalism” and related academic and activist debates.  
The “Death” debates have received much attention within and outside academia, though not yet 
in accounting.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005a) and their followers – collectively referred to 
as “the reapers”11 – claim that mainstream environmentalism is not capable of dealing with the 
challenges of sustainability and needs to be “radically reconceptualized” and “updated into 
something more relevant”.  Their analysis has brought spirited challenges from both the more 
conservative and radical arms of the environmental movement (academics and practitioners); 
with strong parallels to many of the discussions currently taking place within SEA.   
 Our primary purpose is twofold.  First, we articulate the “Death” debates and, in drawing 
attention to the heterogeneity evidenced in these debates, contextualize the contested nature of 
SEA.  Second, we reflect on SEA-civil society engagements in light of these debates, utilizing an 
approach based on the political philosophy of agonistic pluralism (Brown, 2009; Dillard and 
Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012).  In contrast to the consensually-oriented approaches 
evident in most SEA theory and practice, this approach seeks to explicitly recognize and engage 
contestations among groups with divergent ideological perspectives in the interests of fostering 
progressive social change.  We argue that mainstream and SEA accountants have largely 
downplayed and/or under-theorized contingency and conflict and their implications for SEA-
civil society engagement.  They typically ignore these aspects or deny them in various 
depolitizing moves.  Agonistic pluralism, by contrast, views these features as enduring, if not 
ineradicable, dimensions of the social world (Mouffe, 2005, p.17) that provide “conditions of 
                                                 
10
  See Brown (2009); Cooper et al. (2005); Neu et al. (2001); Owen (2008); Shenkin and Coulson (2007); Spence, 
(2009); Spence et al. (2010).  Further, we contend that contemplating “on the ground” social activists’ perspectives 
can complement and enrich SEA research that draws on the work of Bourdieu, Freire, Bakhtin, Gramsci, Laclau and 
Mouffe and other social theorists (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2007b; Brown, 2009; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence, 
2009). 
 
11
 So labelled for their grim diagnosis of mainstream environmentalism and calls for its “death”.  Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus (2005a) stress that, while intending to be provocative, they never claimed existing environmental 
organizations should “close their doors”.  Rather “what needs to die is a particular conception of what 
environmentalism is and how environmental advocacy and campaigns are organized and run” (ibid.). 
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possibility” for progressive social transformations.  As such, we argue that agonistic pluralism 
offers a promising basis for a new (re)energized SEA and a means of forging links between 
SEA-civil society discourses. Following Gray et al. (2009) and others, a key aim is to propose 
new imaginings that help (re)build SEA as a “critical” intervention.  
 The discussion is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we consider three main themes in the 
“Death” debates, namely contestation over mainstream environmentalism’s alleged: (i) 
technocratic approach to issues, knowledge, and politics; (ii) failure to articulate comprehensive 
views, alternative values and inspiring visions; and (iii) failure to build effective progressive 
alliances and public support.  For each theme, we outline issues raised and solutions proposed by 
the “reapers”, consider counter-critiques provided by their critics,12 and draw attention to 
connections with SEA debates.  In Section 3 we reflect on SEA-civil society engagement in light 
of the “Death” debates.  Employing an agonistic pluralism lens, we address:  (i) the possibility of 
an SEA that transcends politics and ideology, (ii) the heterodox voices of engagement, and (iii) 
the tensions between consensus building and adversarialism.  Within the context of agonistic 
pluralism, we consider SEA and its relationship with other interested groups as well as critical 
accountants and provide examples of how we might begin to theorize adversarialism within an 
SEA context.  Section 4 provides some concluding comments. 
 
2.  The “death of environmentalism” debates:  the reapers, their critics and links to SEA 
We have become convinced that modern environmentalism, with all of its unexamined assumptions, outdated 
concepts and exhausted strategies, must die so that something new can live (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, 
p. 10) 
 For Shellenberger, Nordhaus and their supporters, there is something of a paradox 
surrounding modern environmentalism.  Analogous with Gray’s (2010a) reflections on SEA, at 
one level the movement seems very successful.  Environmental organizations “are generally 
larger, stronger, better funded, and more knowledgeable than ever before” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 69) 
moving from the “fringes” to the mainstream, with growing memberships and relatively broad 
                                                 
12
 We focus on criticisms from the environmental justice movement and critical democratic theory which we 
consider have particular pertinence to SEA. 
7 
 
support.  However, the movement seems ill-equipped to deal with contemporary challenges.  For 
example in the United States, Meyer (2005a, p. 69) observes that nothing was accomplished 
during the Clinton-Gore or Bush eras to compare with “such landmark victories as the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, which a much 
more inchoate movement won a generation ago”.  While public support may be relatively high, it 
is also “quite shallow” (ibid.), and most significant indicators of social and environmental health 
continue to head “in the wrong direction” (Werbach, 2004, p. 3). 
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004; 2005a,b; 2007) contend that, while “successful”, modern 
environmentalism has not been more effective because its concepts, methods, ways of framing 
issues, and modes of engagement are outmoded.  To advance the movement needs to interrogate 
its “most basic assumptions about who we are, what we stand for, and what it is that we should 
be doing” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 8).  SEA faces similar issues.13  In addressing 
these questions, Shellenberger and Nordhaus and their supporters charge that modern 
environmentalism suffers from three main interrelated weaknesses.  It frames the issues, 
knowledge, and politics in a narrow, technocratic way; the proposed solutions fail to articulate 
comprehensive views, incorporate alternative values, and inspire compelling visions of the 
future; and presents a political program that fails to conceptualize and build effective progressive 
alliances and public support necessary to achieve long-term social change.   
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 33) argue that these factors – individually, and 
particularly in combination – have left the environmental movement vulnerable to neo-
conservative political agendas.  More generally, progressive groups have been “strategically 
disadvantaged when confronted with value based, longer range, and more carefully framed hard-
right advocacy” (Pope, 2004) manifested in the dominance of “business case” and “ecological 
modernist” framings (cf O’Dwyer, 2003; Brown and Fraser, 2006; Spence, 2007; Owen, 2008; 
Gray et al., 2009; Lehman, 2010). 
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., Gray’s (2006, pp. 803-04) observations regarding “managerialist business as (-almost) usual” SEA 
approaches that place a heavy reliance on “existing mechanisms, assumptions and pre-conceptions” in the form of 
positivistic metrics, tools and research methods. 
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 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005a) and their supporters contend that the environmental 
movement needs to be “radically reconceptualized” and “updated into something more relevant” 
rethinking the movement’s concepts and assumptions, strategies, and political identity.  The 
movement needs to move away from its technocratic discourse and narrow scientific perspective, 
paying more explicit attention to values and politics yielding an aspirational politics energized 
through discussion and debate of values and visions that link issues more directly to everyday 
life experiences and concerns.  The aim should be to build new political alliances based on 
shared values and to reposition environmentalism as part of a progressive agenda for long-term 
social and political change.  We also consider these proposals through the critique presented by 
the environmental justice movement,
14
 facilitating a more critical pluralistic perspective. 
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a, 2007) proclamations of the “death” of 
environmentalism and their proposed solutions have sparked vigorous and wide-ranging debate 
within and outside academia.  The criticisms we consider relate to the way Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus: criticize and frame the issues addressed especially as they relate to the perceived 
importance of technical dimensions; the limitations of their solutions in terms of views, values, 
and vision; and the conservative nature of their proposed political program.  We articulate each 
in terms of the issues raised, the reapers’ proposed solutions, and the counter-critiques developed 
by their opponents.  We also link these contending perspectives to related positions in SEA.  The 
debates are summarized in Table 1. 
 
***** Insert Table 1 here ***** 
 
                                                 
14
 The environmental justice movement is a grassroots movement concerned with linkages between environmental 
issues and broader social and economic injustices.  It emerged in the mid-1980s when a network of neighborhood 
activists, led mainly by women and minority groups from poor communities, began resisting local environmental 
hazards (e.g. toxic dumping) (Meyer, 2005a, pp. 70-1). The movement has much longer historical roots in the 1960s 
civil rights movement (Gelobter et al., 2005). A pivotal event was the 1991 First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit. For further background, see the Environmental Justice Resource Center, 
http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/. 
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Technocratic approach to concerns, knowledge, and politics 
The issues.  Technocratic discourse is tied to the 17
th
 century Enlightenment view that facts and 
values are separable and that “if you just tell people the facts, they will reason to the right 
conclusion – since reason is universal” (Pinker and Lakoff, 2007, p. 66).  Environmentalists 
formulate issues under the assumption that they can “win” debates  and overcome ideological 
and corporate opposition by using sound scientific evidence to prove “the truth” (e.g. about 
anthropocentric climate change), and that once the public is educated about “the facts”, they will 
facilitate change (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31).  Shellenberger and Nordhaus 
(2004, p. 13) describe this as a form of literal-sclerosis, whereby social change is viewed as the 
result of people speaking “a literal ‘truth to power’”.  Such a position is analogous to SEA’s 
focus on disclosure, a problem we might diagnose as disclosure-sclerosis.  The presumption 
seems to be that accountability can be achieved by making visible (disclosing) the actions of 
corporations, of speaking “truth to power” and that transparency will lead to change.  This view 
is not only naive (e.g. in terms of ignoring the entrenched nature of ideological frames, the 
powerful vested interests involved and psychological fears associated with fundamental change), 
but has also been “politically disastrous” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31).   
 In attempting to influence decision-makers and to make problems manageable, 
environmentalists have invested considerable energy in turning interrelated concerns into 
discrete policy issues with technical solutions (e.g. pollution controls, fuel efficiency standards).  
In developing operational reporting regimes, SEA also risks providing reductionist and discrete 
representations that disguise complex and antagonistic interrelationships and obscure “their 
context and their web of connections” (Werbach, 2004, p. 8).  Typically “environmentalism” is 
defined narrowly, with “nature” construed as a distinct “thing”; something “out there”, separate 
from humans, and as such, measurable and representable.  Environmentalists view themselves as 
“protectors” and “defenders” of this reified thing, with “deeply rooted connections to other 
public concerns” disappearing from sight (Meyer, 2005a, p. 70).  The failure to articulate a “big 
picture” view limits the movement, and related reporting regimes, in its ability to address 
10 
 
complex issues such as climate change (Gauna, 2008, pp. 458-59) and too often focuses on 
“effects rather than causes” (Orr, 2005, p. 993).15 
 The reapers’ proposed solutions.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 2007) stress the 
importance of getting out of a technical policy mindset and eschew ideas of a politically-neutral 
approach to environmentalism.  Notions “that social-change omelettes can be made without 
breaking political eggs” or that dealing with issues such as climate change could somehow be 
“above politics” are fantasies that need to die (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31).  The 
facts alone are not enough.
16
  Facts and values are highly interconnected in both the natural and 
social sciences, with no purely value-free or apolitical accounts.  Moreover, and crucially for 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus, overly-technical framings are not necessarily convincing and, even 
if they are, obscure the underlying politics. 
  The reapers urge traditional environmentalists to be more open about the relevance and 
influence of values and ideologies in various dimensions of their work.
17
  Definitions, language 
and framings do not represent incontestable “truths”; they are deeply political.  While the 
development of technology in the form of new metrics, measures and techniques (e.g. to evaluate 
success) is an important aspect of the environmental movement’s work, these need to be better 
understood in terms of how they link to particular political and values-based narratives 
(Werbach, 2004).  For example those with high faith in markets, if they acknowledge an issue at 
all, seek “market solutions” (e.g. emissions trading) (ibid.; see Lehman, 2010 for discussion and 
critique of market mechanisms and related SEA derivatives). 
 The reapers argue that hierarchical “binary thinking” that relies on top-down governance 
techniques and draws stark boundaries between “humans” and “the environment” be replaced 
with framings that emphasize interconnectedness (Werbach, 2004, p. 16).  If humans are 
                                                 
15
 Ironically, it is conservatives who have been most successful in recognizing that “everything is connected” 
(Meyer, 2005b). 
16
 See Lakoff (2004). 
17
 See Dietz et al. (2005) for an extended discussion on the various ways values are invoked in environmental 
attitudes and decision-making.  For more on the implications and value of an ideologically-open approach to 
sustainability assessment, see Söderbaum (2007); Brown (2009) and Söderbaum and Brown (2010). 
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conceptualized as part of the environment, it becomes more difficult to see how some human 
issues (e.g. clean air, toxic waste) are labelled as “environmental” while others (e.g. homeless 
people, good jobs) are not (ibid., p. 8).  This requires finding a way of naming “the world 
without separating ourselves from it” (ibid.)   
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 12) also highlight the importance of problematizing 
traditional analytical boundaries constructed to demarcate “environmental” from other issues.  
They charge that “treating global warming as an ‘environmental’ problem and framing its 
solutions as technical” lies “at the heart of the movement’s political failings” (Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A29).  Too often “the environment” is seen as a problem out there that 
needs to be fixed instead of “a human problem having to do with how we organize our society” 
(Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 12).  Rather than defining the global warming as a 
problem of “too much carbon” calling for technical solutions that reduce emissions (e.g. cap and 
trade policies), it might be more expansively reframed around: 
 Trade policies that undermine environmental protections. 
 Overpopulation. 
 The influence of money in American politics. 
 Poverty.  (ibid., p. 14). 
 
Doing so highlights not only that global warming has many causes but also that the solutions we 
dream up depend on how we structure the problem” (ibid.). 
 
 Counter-critique.  Other activist communities such as the environmental justice movement 
recognize the need to connect facts and values and are supportive of drawing attention to the 
“politics of framing”.  However, they question Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a,b, 
2007) appreciation of the complexity of the issues and, thus, their ability to integrate the socio-
political with the technical.  For example, Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ conceptualization of 
“environmentalism” and “the environment” makes little attempt to acknowledge or understand 
different strands of environmentalism (e.g. environmental justice advocates, preservationists, 
eco-spiritualists) and associated discourses.  They thus arguably fall prey to a reductionist 
perspective, albeit at a different level, that assumes “a unity of perspectives about ‘core 
12 
 
progressive values’” (Brulle and Jenkins, 2006, p. 84).18  This is analogous to the way some 
writers have tried to articulate “the social accounting project” as if there was a single 
homogeneous SEA community (cf Gray et al., 2009). 
 Another example of the lack of nuanced framing is Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004) 
unwillingness to adequately consult either the international environmental movements or their 
histories.  Watson (2005), founder of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, for example, noted 
that the “entire paper is premised upon interviews with the most conservative, most entrenched 
and most bureaucratic environmental leaders and restricted to the United  States” and displays 
“no grasp of the true complexity and the great diversity within the international and U.S. 
environmental  movements”.  Rather, they “write as if the solution can be found by simply 
having… 25 environmental leaders’ rethink and restrategize their positions” (ibid.).19  Blain 
(2005), an environmental justice activist, in asking “ain’t I an environmentalist?” observes that: 
 “The Death of Environmentalism” should be called “The Death of Elite, White, American Environmentalism”...  
That the DOE interviews and recommendations only focused on white, American male-led environmentalism 
meant that the fatal flaws of that part of the environmental movement infected the critique itself.”20 
 
 Dunlap (2006) observes that the reapers not only ignore “the vibrant environmental justice 
movement and grassroots environmentalism of all types in the United States” (p. 89), they “also 
completely ignore vital environmental movements in other nations, both rich… and poor…, as 
well as the growing degree of transnational environmental activism… and its links to the broader 
antiglobalization movement” (p. 100).  Many of these groups had been providing critiques of 
mainstream environmentalism for years
21
 and have long-standing traditions of environmentalist 
activism.   
                                                 
18
 Kysar (2008, p. 2046) notes the irony of presenting such a monolithic view, musing why Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus failed to follow their own advice of “pluralizing singular categories”. 
19
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004) critique was based on interviews with 25 “top leaders, thinkers and funders” 
(p. 5) from the mainstream environmental movement. 
20
 See also Gelobter et al. (2005) noting that many environmental activists from poor and coloured communities 
“would rather not stand on the shoulders of certain early conservation heroes”. 
21
 Gauna (2008, p. 462), for example, points to a hard-hitting letter sent by environmental justice advocates to 
leaders of the ten largest environmental NGOs in 1990 (reprinted in Rechtschaffen et al., 2009, p. 22-4). 
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 The environmental justice movement has been particularly critical of the reapers’ relative 
silence on the framing of “environmental issues” in relation to issues of economic, social and 
cultural (in)justice.  For example, Aguilar (2005) notes that for poor urban communities 
“environmentalism has seemed to be about preserving places most of us will never see”.  Even 
when focusing on problems such as pollution, economic development, decent jobs, housing, 
health care and schools are not addressed (ibid.).   Social and critical accountants have similarly 
pointed to the banality of mainstream accounting – and some SEA – frameworks from the 
perspective of subaltern communities in the developed and developing worlds except as a way of 
rationalizing and imposing neo-liberal reforms (Neu, 2001; Rahaman et al., 2004; Belal and 
Owen, 2007; Graham, 2009; Molisa et al., forthcoming). 
 From an environmental justice perspective, Cohen (2006, p. 76) charges that Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus’, as well as the mainstream environmental movement’s, “historic disinclination to 
talk about distributional questions” renders both unable to deal with the implications of, for 
example, globalization.  Issues need to be explored across race, ethnic, social class, gender, age, 
geographic and other lines, recognizing that “the roots of our ecological crisis and the roots of 
our social inequities and injustices are deeply intertwined” (Smith, 2005).  Environmental issues 
differentially impact ethnic minorities, poor communities and less developed countries, making 
race and class analysis and distributional issues central to research and practice agendas.   
Highlighting that not all people are situated equally brings a focus on “who benefits?” (e.g. from 
a “green economy”) and “who bears the burdens?” (e.g. of toxic wastes) and the socio-economic 
needs of vulnerable groups (Gauna, 2008, p. 463).  Questions of self-determination (e.g. in 
indigenous communities) and participation and democratic governance, or “who says and 
decides?” also become key.  Such questions are conspicuously absent from most SEA work.22 
 Moreover, traditional use of terms such as “nature” and “the environment” is not necessarily 
as “naïve and essentialized” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2058) as the reapers claim.  For some, the term 
environmentalism involves “a complex value assessment regarding the pace and direction of 
human activity” as opposed to a strict literal claim about the separateness of the physical world 
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  See Belal and Owen (2007) on the ways in which managerialist SEA privileges the perspectives and interests of 
Western developed nations over those of lesser developed nations. 
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(ibid., p. 2059).  With regards to framing for political purposes, Pope (2004) points to the power 
of organizing around concepts such as “polluter pays”, “prevention” and “prudence” and talking 
about current patterns of consumption as a “public health problem”.  This is similar to the 
reasons Gray (2008, pp. 7-8) provides for SEA anchoring “the universe of possible accounts 
about and by organisations… – with varying degrees of firmness – to the notion of 
accountability” as, for example, “a place where the Marxist could talk to the liberal” through a 
shared interest in democratizing social institutions.  We return to the important but challenging 
issue of building political alliances for social change shortly.  Before doing so, we consider the 
second major problem of the environmental movement specified by Shellenberger and Nordhaus 
as its failure to articulate comprehensive views, alternative values, and inspiring visions.   
 
Failure to articulate comprehensive views, alternative values and inspiring visions  
The issues.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 6) charge that the environmental movement 
has failed to articulate a political vision that reflects the magnitude of the current environmental 
crises.  Because of their technocratic approach, “technical proposals” too often focus on short-
term policy pay-offs (ibid., p. 25), rather than focusing on developing a broader values-based 
discourse.  They scrutinize “policies without giving much thought to the politics that made the 
policies possible” (ibid., p. 7, emphasis in original), neglecting the development of “political 
proposals that, through alternative vision and values they eject into debates, create the context for 
electoral and legislative victories down the road” (ibid., p. 25).  There is no inspiring values-
based, comprehensive vision that indicates the transformations required or the propensity of 
people to undertake them (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005a).  Werbach (2004, p. 17) charges 
that, in the absence of well-articulated vision and values, movements are better at knowing who 
and what they are against rather than who and what they do, could or should stand for and with. 
 An overly pragmatic and incrementalist approach means comprehensive programs are 
eschewed in favor of politically realistic and feasible initiatives (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 
2004, p. 24).   This stance is analogous to the “pragmatists” within SEA who prefer to focus on 
convincing “the people ‘in charge’” that “change is for the best” (Adams and Whelan, 2009, p. 
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126).  A preoccupation with realpolitik means the “issues affecting the disorganized and 
disenfranchised” are not well-represented and “big structural problems and imbalances of 
power” are not addressed.  There is a tendency to celebrate small legislative or policy victories, 
exhibiting a seeming indifference to broader neo-conservative trends that put whole regulatory 
frameworks at risk (Schmitt, 2005a).  The State is problematically assumed to be a neutral party 
(Arnold, 1990; Archel et al., 2009; see also Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2008, p. 1138 noting 
how SEA could learn from “reforming stakeholders” in terms of casting a more critical eye on 
the performance of political institutions and regulators).
23
 
 The reapers’ proposed solutions.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005b, 2007) argue that 
the environmental movement needs to recognize it is in a “culture war” and create a new politics 
paying explicit attention to core values and to building a visionary and inspirational movement 
based on an understanding of the politics of framing.  The environmental movement needs to 
consider the ways in which political narratives can “activate and sometimes change... deeply held 
values” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 32) by articulating “a more expansive, more 
inclusive and more compelling vision for the future” (Werbach, 2004, p. 5) 
 Environmentalists need to be more creative, innovative and imaginative, motivating a vision 
of the “good life” that “can inspire broad and deep commitment among citizens” (Meyer, 2005b).  
Technocratic rationality would be replaced by a “metaphysics of becoming” (Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus, 2007, p. 219) that involves “creating a new language, a new set of strategic initiatives, 
a new set of institutions, and a new metric for evaluating our success” (Werbach, 2004, p. 16).  
Werbach points to Rorty’s work on redescription which involves a “talent for speaking 
differently” as a key aspect of social change (ibid., p. 15).  Here the reapers stress the need to 
recognize the contingency and instability of meaning and interpretation, looking for the “cultural 
space available for framing and reframing policy disputes” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2055).  Applied to 
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 One example is in the area of labour law where policymakers have sought to water down union demands by 
relying on voluntarist approaches and hard-won legislative provisions have been interpreted by judicial bodies 
through conservative frames that remain wedded to notions of managerial prerogative (Dannin, 2006; see Davenport 
and Brown, 2002, Chpts. 8-12 for discussion in the context of disclosure of financial and non-financial information). 
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SEA, these suggestions are consistent with Gray’s (2002a) call for the imagining of new 
accountings, other possible worlds, and ways of doing things, and Brown’s (2009) reflections on 
sustaining and transforming subjectivities through counter-accounts and dialogic interaction.  
Key here is recognition of the highly political nature of language and framing. 
 An effective environmentalism connects honestly and respectfully with people’s “everyday” 
lives and concerns (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005a).  People need to see that they have a 
personal stake in the issues and to understand how the issues affect their “material and 
nonmaterial aspirations” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2005b, p. A30).  The reapers’ politics of 
possibility is arguably not so much “an effort to change public attitudes” as “to bring the 
progressive agenda into closer contact with public attitudes that are already sympathetic”, 
allowing relevant publics to be mobilized in a way that effectively counters “an increasingly 
sophisticated opposition” (Meyer, 2005b).  As with Gray’s (2002a) plea for new accountings, 
this must go way beyond managerialist imaginings and needs to recognize that preferences, 
aspirations and interests themselves are not fixed (Brown, 2009). 
 The environmental movement’s core vision and values can frame political conflicts and 
controversy such that short-term defeats (e.g. failures to secure regulation) can still enhance the 
“movement’s power, energy and influence” and supporters over the longer-term (Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 22).  “Anchored to core values” rather than technical policy 
specifications, initial defeats may facilitate “the way for eventual victory” (ibid.) by, for 
example, flushing out conservatives reluctance to implement meaningful change.  If 
environmentalists are too concerned about “politically feasible” and “impractical proposals”, 
they will not inspire sufficient risk-taking (ibid., p. 16). 
 Counter-critique.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a,b, 2007) conceptualization of 
comprehensive views, alternative values, and inspiring vision are criticized for themselves being 
too narrow and grounded in traditionally privileged ways of thinking.  Critics charge that they 
are still heavily influenced by the incrementalist, rationalist and positivistic perspectives they 
purport to eschew and ignore alternative strategies such as those adopted by social movements 
whose “ability to achieve effective action is not dependent on government agencies or 
bureaucratic hierarchies” (Zelezny and Bailey, 2006, p. 105; cf Shenkin and Coulson, 2007, 
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calling for more engagement with “non-institutional” organizations).  These include, inter alia, 
initiatives based on place-based environmentalism, direct protest action and mass mobilization, 
new media technologies, rights-based advocacy, legal and pension fund activism,
24
 public 
ecology, and post-positivist conceptions of science (Gelobter et al., 2005; Kysar, 2008; Luke, 
2005; Pope, 2004).  Following from their alleged elitist, North American, male-dominated 
perspective, the reapers are also rebuked for basing their analysis on (white) male norms and 
instrumental problem-solving; failing to consider feminist approaches such as those based on 
reframing issues around an “ethic of care” (Zelezny and Bailey, 2006; see Shearer, 2002 for 
discussion in an accounting context).
25
    
 Brulle and Jenkins (2006, p. 82) and environmental justice activists, in common with critical 
accountants, highlight that cultural reframing without addressing structural impediments is 
“logically flawed”, undermining the democratic values Shellenberger and Nordhaus “purport to 
champion” (ibid., p. 85): 
Their entire analysis is premised on changing cultural beliefs without addressing political and economic change. 
Social reality is defined simply in terms of how we perceive reality. If we just get the right frames out there, it 
will create political consensus, and the progressive alliance can then take power. However comforting this idea 
might sound, it is a form of linguistic mysticism that assumes that social institutions can be transformed by 
cultural redefinition alone….[T]he rise of the right is also based on increased concentration of social power, both 
in the economy generally and in the mass media. Pouring new rhetoric into the same socioeconomic system will 
accomplish little… The structure of power has to be changed as part of the process, and any rhetorical strategy 
that promises to be effective must link its rhetoric to a broader political strategy that includes grassroots 
organizing at its base (ibid., p. 84, emphasis in original). 
 
 In failing to adequately address the need for structural change, the reapers effectively 
advocate “the same kind of arrogant elitism” they ostensibly wish to overturn (Cohen, 2006, p. 
79) and ignore the importance of political mobilization  and struggle in challenging entrenched 
power relations.  Brulle and Jenkins (2006, p. 85) observe that Shellenberger and Nordhaus do 
not adequately address how “change in worldviews will be organized or who will get to define 
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  These include calls to grant legal standing to future generations, non-human constituencies, linking 
environmental, human, socio-cultural and economic rights. 
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 See also Agarwal (2000, p. 283) on “the distinctness of women’s social networks” as a potentially “important (and 
largely ignored) basis for organising sustainable environmental collective action”. 
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core progressive values” but evidently “assume it will be professional experts such as 
themselves” using the insights of cognitive linguistics.  By acting as consultants to progressive 
organizations, these professionals become “arbiters of progressive values” with the general 
public treated as a relatively passive “audience for the marketing of these ideas” (ibid.).  Brulle 
and Jenkins (2006, p. 85) worry that, in place of participatory dialogue and interaction between 
leaders, activists and lay publics such as that followed by labour, civil rights, feminist and other 
20
th
 century social movements, “we get a progressive self-development frame sold by 
technocrats through clever spin techniques” (ibid.). Citizens must be engaged in serious dialogue 
and collective action rather than treated as “mass opinion to be manipulated” (ibid., p. 85).26   
 While sympathizing with Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ critique of the mainstream 
environmental movement’s assumption that science allows politics to be transcended, Kysar 
(2008) claims that they, in turn, offer little more than a “politics of perceptual and cultural 
manipulation” (p. 2070).   Their approach comes across as instrumental, promoting (re)framing 
as an effective means to achieve given policy ends (p. 2044).  For example, Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus’ concede “that adaptation-focused climate change policies are intended primarily to 
get the public on board with climate action, so that more stringent policy responses eventually 
can become palatable” (p. 2070).  Social marketing through the instrumental use of 
deconstruction and framing as part of a pragmatic “toolbox”, together with other contradictions 
in Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ work, suggest they “have not transcended the Enlightenment 
framework as fully as they claim” (ibid.).  To argue for the construction of an “alternative 
meaning for global warming… that would inspire excitement, aspiration, and innovation” but fail 
to acknowledge that scientific rationalism still provides the intellectual basis for accounting “for 
why climate change is a problem at all”, is at best, naïve (ibid.). 
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 Lakoff (2004, pp. 100-01) acknowledges that “the notion of reframing” can sound “manipulative”.  However, he 
is adamant that his approach is not “spin or propaganda” because it is based on teaching progressives “to 
communicate using frames that they really believe”.  This contrasts with conservatives’ use of deceptive rhetoric 
such as the “Clear Skies Act” to label legislation that increases air pollution.  Brulle and Jenkins (2006, p. 86) do not 
find this argument convincing, noting that the approach is still elitist “trying to mobilize supporters as if they were 
isolated consumers of ideas rather than citizens”.   
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 Kysar (2008) further cautions that while Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ views on the role of 
imagination in politics “are insightful”, they are also “dangerously incomplete” (p. 2068).  They 
are unable “to explain why, having accepted the importance of ‘creating new truths’… any 
particular set of new truths should be supported or accepted” (ibid., emphasis in original).  There 
is no “way of evaluating [their] wares, other than how well they sell” (ibid., p. 2046).  We are 
left with a republic of consultants rather than citizens.  According to Kysar, what is needed is a 
constitution for this “consultants republic” that provides “a set of structural provisions that would 
govern the nature of the products and the level of competitiveness present in a market for 
meaning creation, along with the appropriate liberties and protections that individuals might 
require within such an overdetermined and highly manipulable social imaginary” (ibid.).  In 
asking that we “dream differently” in addressing the current environmental crises, Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus fail to explain “how it is we know that these “crises” exist, or how we can be 
confident that the politicians, consultants, and other “dream” purveyors who come to our aid will 
not induce a collective nightmare” (ibid.).  If key factors for success are marketing budgets and 
cognitive knowledge, Kysar (2008, p. 2071) asks “why should environmentalists be more 
successful than the beneficiaries of the status quo, who will likely invest mightily, and 
successfully, in its preservation?”27  A key fear for Kysar is that we are “left not with a politics, 
but a pornography of possibility, in which virtually any policy aim could be packaged and 
marketed to activate virtually any cultural worldview” (ibid., pp. 2073).   
 Gauna (2008, p. 469) agrees that new frames are needed that speak to deeper values (e.g. 
fairness and community) and specific injustices, but cautions against the idea of “banishing the 
technocrats” from progressive movements.  Social movements also require technical resources.  
For example, scientific rationalism has helped establish global warming as an “obvious, and 
unavoidable issue” (Little, 2005a).  Gauna (2008, p. 469) suggests that “far from being a central 
                                                 
27
 For discussion of the key role funding has played in right-wing politics through networks of conservative 
foundations, think tanks, university programs and media outlets, see People for the American Way Foundation 
(1996).  See also Ward (2005) on how funder-imposed constraints have undermined critical research (e.g. through a 
focus on narrowly defined policy perspectives and problem statements, incremental and technology-oriented 
solutions).  Ward (2005) notes that it is ironic that Shellenberger and Nordhaus were not more critical of funders 
given that their critique of mainstream environmentalism “is a letter-perfect description of the conditions that attach 
to virtually every environmental foundation request for proposal”. 
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failure of the conventional environmental movement, the focus on the technicalities of pollution 
control, risk, and resource management is perhaps its greatest contribution”.  What needs to go 
are “entrenched notions of privilege” that see conventional environmental NGOs as the main 
player (ibid.).  According to this perspective, technicians are still important but as part of a much 
larger project, which also requires connections with grassroots movements and other alliances.   
 Connecting facts and values in developing an effective political program requires a major 
rethink of the politics behind “neutral” accounting technologies.  For example, we need to 
problematize current understandings of the “reporting entity” and techniques such as risk 
analysis and discounting that systematically discriminate against specific groups and/or future 
generations (Bebbington et al., 2007a; Hanlon, 2010).  Along with Hopwood (2009, p. 434), we 
do not see a “post-calculative society” as either particularly feasible or desirable, but the polity 
needs to understand the linkages between the socio-political and the technical, supported by 
accountants that put the public (or rather multiple publics) back into “public interest” (cf 
Burawoy’s 2004 calls for public sociologies; see also Carter and Toms, 2010, pp. 179-80). 
 
Failure to build effective progressive alliances and public support 
The issues.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 2007) charge that environmentalists often 
miss opportunities for building effective progressive alliances (e.g. with unions, civil rights 
groups, industry) necessary to accomplish long-term social change objectives.  As a result of 
defining problems narrowly, environmental leaders tend to “come up with equally narrow 
solutions” (ibid., p. 9-10) that appeal to a narrow constituency.  The environmental movement 
has become “increasingly isolated” and ultimately a “self-replicating (and stubbornly 
homogenous) community” (Prakash, 2005) with “its own experts, its own professionals, its own 
lobbyists, its own lawyers, its own funders, its own mailing lists and its journalistic beat” 
(Werbach, 2004, p. 17).  As a result, policies are often formulated in isolation from 
developments in the wider progressive community.  Similar but disconnected programs constrain 
and divide available resources, and fragmentation prevents different constituencies from forming 
critical alliances. 
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 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 2007) and others also charge that mainstream 
environmental leaders have become too disconnected from laypeople.  In focusing on technical 
policy proposals and adopting an “‘inside the Beltway’ mentality” (Straughan and Pollak, 2008, 
p. 1),
28
 they do not connect sufficiently with the values, concerns and aspirations of ordinary 
citizens, and thereby fail to enrol them as allies.  Further, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005b, p. 
A29) observe that progressive writers sometimes display condescending attitudes towards the 
public, for example, accusing them of not being able to “stand too much reality” or “failing to 
grasp their own economic self-interest”.  For example, Gray (2010b, p. 25) notes that “one 
problem with democracy is that the people may collectively choose to act inappropriately”.  
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005b, p. A29) suggest the failure to form alliances arises from 
a failure to understand the wider public or frame issues in a way that is meaningful for laypeople.   
For example, the reapers question the framing of climate change issues as threats, crises and 
disasters as a strategy for gaining public support.  They maintain that the environmental 
movement has relied too much on fear and negativity and a “politics of limits” rather than one of 
possibility in attempting to build political support (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2007).  
Developing effective means of motivating support “depends not on our ability to shock but rather 
to inspire” (Werbach, 2004, p. 24) and “to prompt mobilization and action” with fear linked to 
hope rather than despair (Meyer, 2005a, p. 74). 
 The reapers’ proposed solutions.  Shellenberger, Nordhaus and their supporters urge the 
environmental movement to invest more heavily in broad-based coalition-building instead of 
single issue politics. The movement needs to think carefully about the values and political vision 
it shares with other constituencies and re-frame issues and organize accordingly.  Joining 
together with other progressive individuals and groups and recognizing their causes are 
interrelated is necessary to advance social change objectives.   
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 The phrase “Inside the Beltway” is used to denote concerns that the environmental movement has been overly 
“professionalized”, with leaders too focused on working with policymakers and politicians in central Governments.  
As such, it is argued, the movement’s leaders have become socialized into an overly polite and compromised form 
of reformist politics based on discussion among elites.  The public, in turn, increasingly disconnect from 
participation in civil society.  See Dowie (1995) for an extended discussion of these issues. 
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 Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005b, p. A30-1) also emphasize the importance of injecting 
“vision and values into contested political space – where politicians and others have to take sides 
on specific, controversial proposals”.  The “veil of bi-partisanship” must be dropped (Werbach, 
2004, p. 32).  Otherwise general concepts such as sustainability end up being ideas “that 
everyone is for but nobody understands” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31).  The aim 
is to frame issues in a way that is consistent with the ideologies of progressive communities, 
rather than being drawn into conservative narratives.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 26) 
argue that injecting new frames and “big ideas into contested political spaces” can help to 
(re)define debate by challenging the status quo, putting opponents on the defensive, attracting 
allies and building political momentum.  Specifically, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 
2007) favour reorienting policy proposals around investments in clean energy technologies that 
would benefit multiple constituencies rather than policies of cuts and restrictions.  They seek to 
frame the “new energy economy” not merely as an “environmental solution” or “technical fix”, 
but as part of an overall vision for creating jobs and promoting improved health and living 
standards globally.  Werbach (2004, p. 32) argues that being partisan means environmentalists 
openly aligning themselves with the Democratic Party in the USA. 
 The Apollo project is an example of Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, pp. 26-8) win/win 
politics designed to appeal to groups not traditionally aligned with the environmental movement.  
The project is an environmental-labour-industry alliance that advocates for public investment in 
the development of clean energy industries and infrastructure on the basis that it will, inter alia, 
create good jobs, lessen emissions, and reduce United States dependence on foreign oil.  Its aim 
is “to define a vision around the values of prosperity, freedom and opportunity – as well as 
ecological restoration and interdependence – out of the belief that this vision is more welcoming 
of the American people, businesses and labor unions than more talk of ‘polluter pays,’ ‘fuel 
efficiency’ and ‘carbon caps’” (Werbach, 2004, p. 24).29 
 Counter-critique.  Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a,b; 2007) have been criticized 
for emphasizing politically conservative third-way strategies (e.g. investments in public-private 
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 The Apollo Alliance is still in existence, but Shellenberger and Nordhaus are no longer active in it.  The alliance’s 
leadership publicly disassociated itself from the “death of environmentalism” thesis (Little, 2005a). 
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partnerships) as the basis for their more inclusive “environmental politics” (Cohen, 2006, p. 80; 
Zelezny and Bailey, 2006).  For example, Paehlke (2005, p. 500) states that the New Apollo 
Project
 
proposals look “a bit like ecological modernization on steroids”.  Like other attempts to 
mainstream environmentalism, Apollo is seen by critics as a technocratic, business as usual 
approach “that resists significant changes in the institutional status quo” (Kysar 2008, p. 2044 
citing Coglianese, 2001).  In focusing on devising win-win solutions based on public-private 
partnerships, differences and conflicts are glossed over.  For example, Pope (2004) points out 
that a reconfiguration of the energy market would not be a “win-win” for Exxon-Mobil.  Given 
the current anti-tax, anti-regulatory environment, making a case for significant government 
intervention will be challenging (Schmitt, 2005b).  Watson (2005) chides that Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus want to serve up “happy meals wrapped… in positive, pretty wrappings”.  They are 
trying to sell a “feel good” fantasy to provide the “illusion” of solving problems, when they are 
“just changing the window dressing”. 
 Again, the reapers can learn much from other social movements about building broad-based 
networks and alliances (e.g. across environmentalists, labour, business leaders, ethical investors, 
faith-based communities, academics, policymakers) and working collaboratively for social 
change.  For example the environmental justice movement stresses the need for respectful 
alliances that appreciate not only people’s commonalities but also the diversity of their 
standpoints.  They have sought to encourage a more multi-issue and multi-perspectival approach 
to political participation articulated around a much broader definition of “the ‘environment’ as 
the place where people live, work, play, learn, and worship” (Gauna, 2008, p. 466).  In 
recognition of the importance of language and (re)framing, this provides “a different way of 
thinking and talking about the environment” with humans and urban landscapes firmly drawn 
back “into the picture” (Pastor, 2005, p. 3).  
 The expert-driven process advocated by Shellenberger and Nordhaus is inadequate in building 
broad-based engagement and support.  In order to develop a more inclusive coalition, the role of 
scientific and policy experts and managers must be challenged and increased confidence shown 
in the ability of ordinary citizens to address concerns that affect them and with which they are 
familiar (Meyer, 2005b).  “It is not enough for the elite… to examine what they can do 
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differently while maintaining their position of power. They need to be open to options that 
require them to interrogate their own position of privilege and to share power” (Gauna, 2008, p. 
463).  This entails recognizing and building the social wealth necessary for democratic 
governance, community organizing, collective action and empowerment.
30
   
 With respect to issues such as climate change, Gauna (2008, p. 466) suggests that the 
definition of “environment” needs to be extended “to include considerations of climate justice, 
ecological resources of global significance, and protection of biodiversity”.  Any 
reconceptualization needs to be able to link “longer-term distributional impacts of climate 
change to the more immediate problems currently facing vulnerable communities, such as 
natural resource depletion, pollution, and the lack of access to emergency response services” 
(ibid., p. 467).  This requires a careful unpacking of distributional implications at local, national 
and international levels and across time and space.  Consistent with Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 
such efforts reflect a commitment to identify and invest in large ideas and “big fights” that 
support deep social change and “intersections in progressive politics that... allow [people] to 
come together in radically new ways” (Gelobter et al., 2005).  However, Gauna (2008) stresses 
that building transformative alliances is hard work and “requires an examination of privilege, 
diversity, interdependency, and distributional concerns” (p. 458).  To be transformative, new 
environmentalism must not “simply replicate old forms of domination with a few new players” 
(p. 470) but seriously address differences in people’s perspectives, geographies and histories. 
 Shellenberger and Nordhaus seem to implicitly assume a deliberative model of politics – one 
that relies on “inclusive public deliberation… geared to reaching consensual decisions” (Kapoor, 
2008, p. 97).  Deliberative political visions are “relatively smooth” based on the idea “that social 
complexity is manageable” and asymmetric power relations can be neutralized given appropriate 
processes and rational communication that allow diverse viewpoints “to be heard and 
adjudicated” (ibid., p. 103-05).  As such they tend to gloss over, ignore and erase difference.  
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 As Pastor (2005, p. 1) frames it “there is as much beauty in [a] group of people… and their struggle for social 
justice as there is in the kind of pristine landscape that comes to mind when we generally think about the 
environment”. 
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Deliberative political models are somewhat – and arguably dangerously – idealistic.  Consensus-
oriented models of politics tend “to simplify community, to represent it in uni-dimensional 
ways” which “makes the attainment of results easier” but risks socio-economic elites imposing 
their perspectives (ibid. p. 105; Archel et al. 2011).  We envision a messier reality characterized 
by ongoing ideological contestation between plural social groups.   Agonistic pluralism 
advocates a decentred participatory politics that facilitates the expression of difference, rather 
than asking that people overcome their particularities.  It embraces a democratic vision that is 
open but nonetheless critical (Kapoor, 2008, p. 104).  As such, it is sceptical of universalizing 
narratives and top-down views of politics centred on State agencies or business-led self-
regulation, privileging approaches that engage multiple publics with conflicting ideological 
perspectives.  New social movements and civic networks cutting across various social spheres 
offer a way to counter monologic discourse and politics, giving voice to currently marginalized 
groups.
31
 We consider this to be a view of politics and engagement that offers much to SEA.   
 The “Death” debates provide a context for deliberations and debates within SEA.   They help 
articulate the heterodox issues and constituencies that should be recognized and included in the 
SEA dialogue and community.   This is especially the case given SEA’s professed aim to contest 
the monologism of mainstream accounting; in particular, the privileging of shareholder and 
business perspectives (Gray, 2006; Brown, 2009).   Both the reapers and their critics are 
concerned about the limits of technocratic approaches to environmentalism and both groups seek 
to promote more participatory forms of democratic politics that move beyond the priorities of 
established elites.  Moreover, the various antagonisms identified in the “Death” debates highlight 
issues and perspectives that have received little attention in SEA literature.  In the next section, 
we reflect on SEA-civil society engagement in light of the “Death” debates, utilizing agonistic 
pluralism as a way of theorizing political relations in this highly contested terrain. 
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 This does not assume that all social movements are “benign and ‘progressive’“; some are recognized as  
“co-opted by the state and… internally undemocratic” (Kapoor 2008, pp. 108-09). 
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3.  Reflections on SEA-civil society engagement in light of the “Death” debates  
In Section 2 we identified political antagonisms at several levels that seem unlikely to be 
overcome, at least in the foreseeable future.  For example at one level, SEA is pitted against the 
traditional accounting establishment just as the environmental movement is pitted against 
conservative elements of the business, Government and policy communities.  At another level, 
antagonisms exist within SEA between the business case advocates, pragmatic interventionists, 
and critical revolutionaries.   In the interests of fostering progressive change, a political theory is 
needed that recognizes and facilitates (ant)agonistic
32
 contestation between these groups and 
creates spaces of possibility through which new, or previously obscured, alternatives emerge.  
 We seek to resensitize SEA to its critical and pluralistic roots (Gray, 2002a; O’Dwyer, 2005) 
by advocating a version of pluralism that is less “politically quiet” than earlier SEA versions.  
We propose a polylogic approach to engagement based on an agonistic model of democratic 
participation (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012).
33
 This 
approach seeks to engage divergent socio-political perspectives, surface the unavoidable values 
and assumptions associated with different accounts and underline the power relations that 
structure “dialogue” opportunities.  Such a perspective involves an understanding of SEA that is 
much broader than formal organization-centric reports and recognizes the need for multiple 
engagements between different actors across various political spaces. 
Contrary to consensus-oriented approaches to dialogics in the SEA-civil society sphere 
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 Following Mouffe, we conceptualise agonism as a form of antagonism, used to denote the idea of “friendly 
enemies” that share a basic agreement to engage in a democratic fashion.  As such, we do not envisage agonism 
overcoming antagonisms.  Rather we emphasise that there are different types of antagonism.  For example, as we 
elaborate later, environmentalists and labor interests may have divergent viewpoints but still build a common 
political alliance against neoliberalism.  Relations between a labour-environmental alliance and neoliberal interests 
would entail a “fuller” version of antagonism than those within the alliance.  Agonistic pluralism, while recognising 
an important place for various forms of protest action in democratic political relations, resiles from full-blown 
antagonism in the sense of violence (and, even here, we note there are usually “rules of war” that bring some 
sociality into the “relation”).  Agonistic pluralists also emphasise that “we’s” and “they’s” may change as a result of 
(ant)agonistic encounters, for example where political struggles lead people to new social logics such as we have 
witnessed over time with respect to the civil rights and women’s movements (albeit that these struggles are 
ongoing). 
33
 Brown (2009) uses the term “dialogic” rather than “polylogic”, but following Dillard and Roslender (2011) we 
favour the latter on the basis that it encourages the recognition of many different perspectives (logics). 
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(e.g., Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, p. 1116), we would not evaluate the success of 
engagements in terms of their ability to resolve conflict.  Surfacing, enabling the expression of 
conflict and fostering the formation of oppositional communities are at least equally important in 
agonistic projects.  We do not, for example, agree that those with deep green ideologies are 
likely to have no use for accounting broadly understood (ibid., p. 1123).  SEA does not need to 
be restricted to ecological modernist understandings of accounts as Georgakopoulos and 
Thomson (2008) appear to imply; visual methods, notions of SEA that provide testimony/bear 
witness, anti-accountings etc. could all be applicable here.  Our concept of polylogics recognizes 
that the issue of what counts as “evidence” or, indeed, dialogue is itself highly political (e.g., see 
Hanlon, 2010 for discussion in the context of risk analysis) and “logics” are not restricted to 
traditional modernist logics.   
 We see three related issues emerging from the “Death” debates, each of which has important 
implications for SEA-civil society engagement.  Firstly, an over-reliance on technocratic 
reasoning and solutions that subordinates subjective reason gives an appearance of 
depoliticization that obscures the political forces and powerful interests striving to maintain the 
monologic status quo.  Secondly, a more realistic and desirable heterogeneous context requires 
that interested groups’ views, values, and visions be presented and considered and strategies to 
deal with prevailing power asymmetries identified.  Thirdly, to develop and implement 
democratic processes, a progressive pluralistic politics is needed that can help articulate and 
operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda.  The formation of new alliances is 
particularly important in the current neoliberal context where, on the one hand, we see increasing 
concentrations of corporate power and on the other, subordinate groups becoming increasingly 
fragmented.  SEA needs to recognize the benefits of incorporating consensus and dissensus 
through agonistic political relations across its different constituencies.  We consider each of these 
three areas in more detail below. 
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The impossibility of an SEA that transcends politics and ideology 
The “Death” debates illustrate the complex political context of what some have attempted to 
specify as problems that can be solved by technical solutions.  As Brown (2009) argues, 
technocratic rationality is heavily influenced by the liberal ideal of neutrality.  Mainstream 
accounting sees its task as providing “neutral facts” that users can employ for their own purposes 
(Solomons, 1991), devoid of any particular ideological ends.
34
  While SEA commentators are 
generally more sensitive to the influence of values and norms in the social construction of 
accounting, implicitly or explicitly, the reporting templates proposed (e.g., GRI, carbon 
reporting) claim their legitimacy by reporting neutral, objective “facts” for decision makers.  
Even the more critical SEA work demonstrates considerable faith in the promise of deliberative 
democratic processes (e.g. through Rawlsian or Habermasian conceptions of objective public 
reason) to foster a depoliticized consensus among those with diverse worldviews and unequal 
power.
35
  As a result, both the mainstream and SEA communities deal inadequately with the 
political side of social relations and tend to downplay “the central role played by passions, 
emotions and acts of collective identification in fostering democracy” (ibid., p. 320).  For 
example, Lehman (2010), while keen to expose the social antagonisms within which SEA is 
embedded, theorizes his recommendations within communitarian conceptions of community 
rather than in critical political theory that attempts to take “difference” more seriously (e.g. see 
Mouffe, 1999; Connolly, 2002; Tully, 2008).  We contend that agonistic political theory offers a 
fruitful way of assisting SEA “to begin to theorise how commonalities can be developed broadly 
enough to allow differences to flourish” (Lehman, 2010, p. 733) while avoiding a destructive or 
distracting “whirlpool of difference and diversity” (ibid., p. 734). 
 Efforts to find a politically neutral or fully inclusive consensual accounting are not only 
unrealistic at an ontological level, but also ethically unsatisfying.  As Kahan (2007, p. 118, 
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 For discussion of mainstream accounting’s political allegiances with the ideologies of neo-classical economics 
and capitalism see Tinker and Gray (2003) and Gray (2006). 
35
 Some versions of deliberative democracy do make serious attempts to accommodate or facilitate political 
contestation (Brown, 2009, p. 321).  Accounting writers have to date focused on the more consensually-oriented 
approaches that emphasize commonalities over the expression of difference(s). 
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emphasis in original) observes in the context of environmental regulation and other controversial 
areas of law, this depoliticization arguably amounts to “a conceit – a form of false consciousness 
that compounds the impulse to enforce a moral orthodoxy by enabling its agents to deny (to 
themselves even more than to others) that this is exactly what they are doing”.36   SEA 
protagonists “inevitably take sides in social conflict and . . . ‘responsible’ [actors]… strive to 
ensure that their choice is a socially well-informed one” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29).   We eschew 
the idea, as did Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ critics, that there is some “third way” where we can 
avoid choosing camps (cf Mouffe, 1998, p. 23).  The construction of collective political identities 
is a key aspect of transformative social change. Recognizing the complexity of the contemporary 
political terrain, we encourage SEA to multiply the differentiated consensual and adversarial 
perspectives it is capable of engaging.
37
   
 The “Death” debates point to the importance of recognizing the diversity among various 
interested groups.  To better understand diverse perspectives and their political implications SEA 
researchers (and the polity more generally) need to pay closer attention to the interpretive 
meanings of “social and environmental” concerns; to think carefully about how they are framing 
and approaching issues; and how this fits the groups with whom they interact.  In addition to 
addressing “factual claims” about specific issues that involve considerable uncertainty and value 
judgements,
38
 polylogic approaches require consideration of broader questions relating to the 
socio-political roots of people’s concerns (Yearley, 2005).  We need to reflect more on what we 
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 Kahan (2007) terms this conceit “cognitive illiberalism”. 
37
 As Spence et al. (2010, p. 85) explain it, in a civil society context: 
Who we are ‘against’ exactly and what we are ‘for’ is something that gets articulated as the ‘people’ begins to emerge 
and does not remain stable… What is needed is to show the political imagination to engage with actors other than 
simply other members of the [Social Accounting/Social and Environmental Reporting] cargo cult.... Moreover, any 
attempts at engagement must go further than simply organisational management and connect with activists, social 
movements and other grass roots actors in their own realm. Then we might just be able to witness the death of the 
‘death of politics’ and contribute in some small part to the birth of an age where everything becomes political.   
Unlike Spence et al. (2010, p. 79), we are not convinced that accountability is “of no real significance to social 
movements”.  Rather we see SEA’s task here as elaborating understandings of accountability that encompass social 
movement perspectives (see also Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). 
38
 For example, the science of human-induced climate change or the likely consequences of particular policy 
interventions. 
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and others are worrying about when we and others worry about SEA issues (ibid., p. 198).  For 
example, people may be concerned about social and environmental degradation “because of the 
risks to themselves, to human health and amenity more broadly, to wild animals, or for some 
other reason” (ibid.).  Or, following Beck (1995) and Giddens (2002), their concerns might 
reflect more general worries (e.g. around genetically modified organisms) concerning the lack of 
knowledge or institutions to deal with “the unintended consequences of human interventions in 
nature” (Yearley, 2005, p. 199).  Or they may involve assertion of the rights of, inter alia, 
indigenous, ethnic, sexual, social class or religious minorities.  
 Here we are sympathetic to Adams and Larrinaga-González’s (2007) caution that academics 
should not impose their viewpoints upon relevant publics (p. 338) and the importance of “the 
researched” contributing to theory development (p. 342).  However we also contend that the 
widespread failure of SEA researchers to engage or consult with stakeholders and social 
movements amounts to its own form of hermeneutic disrespect.
39
  A vibrant SEA “requires real 
debate about possible alternatives”; one that identifies adversaries and provides alternatives to 
the dominant order informed by different political values (Mouffe, 1998, pp. 13-4). In the 
contemporary era of global capitalism, this is arguably a complex multidisciplinary and “local to 
global” project that requires engagement across a wide range of political spaces.  There is a need 
to foster democratic subjectivities that are able to confront the tough conflict-based issues, which 
involve the sorts of polarising debates that Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, p. 34) 
eschew.
40 
 Civil society engagements rather those with private or public sector organisations 
arguably have a greater chance of engaging a wide range of constituencies and are more likely to 
challenge managerialism and neo-liberalism.  This is in marked contrast to perspectives such as 
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 See Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, p. 342) claiming that “social accounting organisational 
engagements… show a higher hermeneutic respect for the research object”.  We note, for example, that Adams and 
McNicholas (2007, p. 397) appear to take management reasons for not engaging stakeholders (“time and resources”) 
at face value without making any attempts to approach stakeholders themselves.
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 See also Mouffe (1998) for critique of the notion of “radical centre” politics without adversaries.  Also, as Adams 
and McNicholas (2007, p. 386) observe, substantive change is “a profound psychological dynamic process, 
involving painful unlearning and difficult relearning” and necessarily involves “emotional stir up”. “Different 
perspectives and backgrounds” can facilitate the “unfreezing” of perceptions (ibid., p. 392).  This insight must be 
taken further than just involving different “team members” within organizations (e.g. from different functional 
divisions) or the stakeholders managements choose to engage (Archel et al, 2011). 
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those of Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, p. 342) who suggest “changes that develop 
inside organisations promise a higher emancipatory potential”.   We consider that “stakeholder 
engagements” that focus on working in business or Government-led processes in the 
contemporary neoliberal context are particularly prone to the risks of co-option.  This is 
evidenced by numerous studies in disciplinary fields such as communicative planning and 
development studies which demonstrate that consensually-oriented approaches are “far more 
likely to reinscribe and legitimate current hegemony” than deliver hoped-for changes (Purcell, 
2009, p. 158; see also Archel et al. 2011 for an accounting example).   
 As we outlined earlier, differences exist among environmentalists not only in terms of the 
visions and values that guide them and ways of translating these into concrete policies, but also 
in terms of the forms of engagement they favour.  These entail varied conceptualizations of 
social change processes and different implicit or explicit criteria for evaluating success and 
failure.  For example, “business as usual” approaches have a relatively narrow focus akin to 
mainstream environmentalism.  If proponents of this perspective accept the presence of systemic 
problems at all, they tend to assume that adequate feedback mechanisms exist and that solutions 
can be found within the current system.  Conceptualising “the environment” as an economic 
asset and working with market remedies such as “green” consumers” and “green jobs” provide a 
claimed apolitical response to the environmental agenda, preserving the ideological system of 
consumer capitalism.
41
  Proponents have a politically consensual view of social change, 
mediated through an ideology of utility-maximising market mechanisms.   
 On the other hand, groups such as the environmental justice movement argue that approaches 
based on eco-modernist ideologies represent a futile attempt to sustain the (unsustainable) status 
quo, claiming that those who work “with business” dilute more radical agendas.  Rather than 
working as “handmaidens to business” or with an “inside the beltway” mentality, they advocate 
closer links with social movements and grassroots organizations. This is complicated by the fact 
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 See also Dey (2007) on the political struggle in Traidcraft over the meaning of “fair trade” and the role of SEA in 
enabling a move from “behaving like a charity” towards “commercial Christianity”.  If these differences in 
ideological perspectives had been teased out earlier, Dey may have been less surprised by the “unexpected 
consequences” of this particular SEA intervention and/or better equipped to counter it. 
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that such movements themselves are not a homogenous group, with some seeking to work 
collaboratively and others advocating a more adversarial approach in their relationships with “the 
establishment” (Blüdorn and Welsh, 2007).  This point, though noted in the SEA literature, is 
rarely explored in-depth. Gray (1992, p. 410), for example, alludes but does not elaborate on 
tensions in the Green movement “over the relative merits of ‘supping with the devil’”.  Twenty 
years on, the point is still noted but rarely addressed in depth.  Ball and Craig (2010, p. 288; see 
also Ball, 2007), for example, in pointing to the possibilities of a social movements in 
organizations approach, refer to an interviewee who commented that Friends of the Earth were 
having difficulty deciding “whether to engage in the Local Agenda 21 and Community Strategy 
processes as a ‘genuine stakeholder, or whether to campaign against it on the Town Hall steps’”.  
Casual reading of the social movements’ literature suggests that both courses of action may be 
required akin to a feminist strategy of “multiple tramping of the same soil” (Cooper, 2001, p. 
129; see also Bruno and Nadotti 1988 on the concept of “dual militancy”).  We see this as an 
area worthy of close and careful future theoretical and empirical exploration. 
 Even when we attempt to introduce models that move beyond traditional economic based 
ones, we must be cognizant of their limitations.  For example, the notion of an adaptive and self-
learning autopoietic system is a more inclusive, systems-oriented approach but also tends to 
depoliticize issues.  Gray et al. (2010, p. 20) use autopoiesis to hypothesize that more “serious” 
versions of SEA will not “code” to Western capitalist ideology and are thus likely to be seen as 
threats to be rejected.  In this sense, they do politicize the concept, and help explain the 
dominance of “business case” approaches to SEA.  For us, this highlights the importance of 
engaging other socio-political perspectives (e.g. adversarial social movements) if managerial 
capture of SEA is to be avoided.  This requires a more polylogic view – one that actively seeks to 
surface bio-cultural diversity in the system (i.e. competing ideological perspectives, both within 
and beyond traditional organizational boundaries). 
 All of these political positions manifest themselves in SEA, with some arguing engagements 
with business have little (or negative) effect and others maintaining they are on the right track 
and understanding “failures” as part of a learning process (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 
2007; Bebbington et al., 2007b; Cooper et al., 2005; Everett and Neu, 2000; Owen, 2008; Spence 
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et al., 2010).  Next, we engage the ideas of agonistic democracy in theorizing the process by 
which these varying perspectives can be recognized and debated.   
 
Heterodox voices of engagement 
Shellenberger and Nordhaus and their critics have provided valuable critiques of technocratic 
approaches to environmentalism that resonate with calls for polylogic approaches to SEA. Taken 
collectively, the “Death” debates also provide nuanced understandings of different ideological 
perspectives and their implications for the types of changes sought and ways of pursuing social 
change.  These include not only the perspectives of academics, but also social activists and other 
“people on the ground”. 
 To date, where SEA researchers acknowledge ideological diversity, they largely focus on 
commonly made distinctions between “shallow/weak” (light green, technocratic, 
anthropocentric) and “deep/strong” (dark green) environmentalism (see, e.g., Bebbington, 2001; 
Aras and Crowther, 2009, p. 282).  The “Death” debates illustrate that such an approach does not 
do justice to the range of discourses available to social actors (Meyer, 2005a, p. 72).  
Shellenberger and Nordhaus, for example, offer an alternative to “deep” approaches that promote 
“a vision of the self in communion with nature”, one that is arguably “rooted in notions of purity 
and authenticity likely to be accessible to few people” (ibid.).  
 Broad environmentalism “emphasizes interconnectedness as a way to integrate concerns 
about global warming, biodiversity, toxic pollution, and so forth, into other policy areas - urban, 
economic, and international” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 72).  However, despite their attempts to pluralize 
and relate climate change issues to “everyday concerns” of diverse constituencies, Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus’ agenda is still somewhat constrained, with those they interviewed and addressed 
being described as a “white, male, wonky bunch” (Grist editorial, 2005).  Critiques from the 
environmental justice and other grassroots movements indicate how debates can and should be 
opened to wider audiences and provide “greater space for heterodox voices” (Meyer, 2005b).  
The purpose is to connect with the “kitchen-table” concerns and aspirations of people in poor 
and minority communities, by giving “everyone a seat at the table” (Grist editorial, 2005).  
34 
 
Having an agenda responsive to the needs of a diverse polity provides “greater voice to class and 
race issues, urban issues, and regional and local issues” (ibid.).  While some have recognized the 
importance of such questions, SEA needs to consciously and conspicuously incorporate them 
into its agenda, by for example, focusing on the value of “local knowledge” and the benefits of 
participatory approaches at the community and wider levels.  At the same time, the challenges 
associated with achieving effective public participation given existing power imbalances in 
society would be recognized.  As Kano and Chang (2005) put it: 
as much as the new strategy has to appeal to values that speak to average people, we also need to be 
concerned about transforming worldview.  Why should someone care about eviction if they’re a 
homeowner? Why should you care about another community’s toxic exposure if you’re not living 
there?  Political education and leadership development to get beyond self-interest is essential for the 
long-term.  
 
 While there may be a need to, at times, educate people, making “them aware of the problem 
that we already understand” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 73, emphasis in original), learning across leaders, 
experts and lay people must always be multi-directional.
42
   This involves recognizing that 
different strands of environmentalism are not necessarily in harmony with one another and that 
there is no “social consensus about… the ‘correct’ human stewardship relationship” (Tarlock, 
2004, p. 223) and actively engages the idea that new relationships have to be imagined and 
“created not recognized” (ibid.).  Such a position extends existing SEA proposals for dialogic 
engagement by enabling it to embrace antagonisms (cf.  Bebbington et al., 2007b, p. 364 relying 
on different groups uncovering “the common ground between them” before “dialogic 
engagements can begin”). 
 Following Dunlap (2006, p. 100)
43
, we propose that SEA can more vigorously and effectively 
pursue the “basic ecological principle [of] supporting diversity” and recognize the need for “a 
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 Cf Adams and Whelan, 2009, p. 136-7) observing that shareholder wealth maximization is “broadly agreed with 
by the ruling (often passive and arguably unthinking) majorities of Anglo-American societies” and that “those who 
consider the existing state of affairs unjustified, need to consider ways in which [SEA] might… give rise to a 
cognitive dissonance in the minds of the ruling majorities… that could… lead to a change in how corporations are 
governed”. 
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 Dunlap’s (2006) advice is targeted at funding bodies (to whom Shellenberger and Nordhaus presented their 
original “Death of Environmentalism” paper to in 2004).  In the interests of promoting a more active civic sphere, 
we seek to apply it more broadly. 
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diverse range of researchers, practitioners, and activists” to contribute to expanded debates and 
new imaginings.  Attempts to give greater visibility to currently marginalized voices through 
various forms of shadow and counter-accountings offer much potential in terms of pluralizing 
the field and taking debates into the civil society sphere (e.g. Carter and Toms, 2010; Dey, 2003; 
Gallhofer et al., 2006; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence, 2009).  They provide a way of 
talking/accounting back to neo-conservative elites, by introducing concepts of conflictual 
knowledge that can be used both adversarially and to build progressive alliances (see further 
below). 
 Actively embracing heterodox voices may be characterized as “relativist”.  With Rorty 
(1991), we resist this term as implying clear cut Platonist dualisms between objectivity and 
subjectivity. We are not saying that different positions are arbitrary in an “anything goes” sense – 
rather that they are genuinely contestable.  Moreover, and crucially, we contend that it is this 
plurality of socially situated actors, their relationships, (ant)agonisms and discursive interactions 
that provides the most hope for transformative social change (Brown, 2009, p. 322-23).  Next, 
we suggest that effective progressive alliances and public support can best be built by 
recognizing and embracing (ant)agonistic relationships among the interested constituencies. 
 
Consensus building or adversarialism? 
SEA commentators are keenly aware of the ideological splits between divergent groups 
interested in sustainability and related issues.  For example, Archel et al. (2011) describe the 
contestations in setting corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy among the State, business 
interests, and civil society.  Brown (2009) and Dillard and Brown (2012) propose that agonistic 
pluralism be applied as a means for theorizing the political antagonisms evident within SEA.  We 
see a need to work with others in the wider polity to foster more pluralistic institutions and 
spaces that encourage debate within and across different communities; to help ourselves and 
others (e.g. students, NGOs, lay communities) find their own place within these debates; to 
provide a fertile context wherein new alternatives emerge; and to prevent cooption of the 
discourse by dominant interests. 
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 SEA and Interested Groups.  The “Death” debates were possible only because the participants 
(NGO leaders, funders, academics, and activists) were prepared to reflect on their perspectives 
regarding social change and engagement and participate in open, spirited debate.
44
  The SEA 
community arguably needs to do the same.  While there have been promising moves in this 
direction (e.g. the “St Andrews Summit” on the future of the Centre for Social and 
Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR))
45
, these have been relatively private forums.  
Discussion within the SEA community, while important, is not enough.  We need to broaden 
debate and engage wider academic and community networks at various levels. This requires 
making broader connections with “fellow-travellers” in other academic communities (e.g. critical 
management studies, heterodox economics, interpretivist policy studies, political theory, critical 
geography) and with social movements (e.g. the environmental justice movement, labor unions, 
eco-feminists, indigenous communities).  As Spence et al. (2010) highlight, SEA has remained 
remarkably detached from other social science literatures and political struggles in civil society; 
seemingly preferring an “apolitical” approach somewhat at odds with its professed social change 
agenda.  With an engagement focus on organizational level fieldwork, SEA too often remains 
silent about wider structural constraints and macro-level power relations (ibid.; Archel et al., 
2011).  This vastly underplays the extent to which liberal democracies are structured by social 
divisions (e.g. class, gender and ethnic conflicts) and how these play out at individual, 
organizational, national and supranational levels. The voices of stakeholders, subaltern 
communities and social activists – and their resistances to managerialist perspectives – rarely 
receive sustained attention. 
 New fora for coalition-building (e.g. multidisciplinary action research, Web-based initiatives) 
potentially provide valuable spaces for debates and discussions across a diverse range of groups.  
Within this context, we need to re-think the role of SEA academics and their relations to 
engagement (Neu et al., 2001; Cooper et al., 2005; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007).  The potential of 
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 Although commentators have noted that Shellenberger and Nordhaus, while critical of the “non-response” to their 
work from the mainstream, have provided little in the way of a response to their own critics (Kysar, 2008, p. 2064-
66). 
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 See the Social and Environmental Journal, Vol. 26(2): 1-2, 14-17 for an overview and Dillard and Brown (2012) 
for related proposals.   
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emerging researchers (and students) to contribute to these endeavours is worthy of special 
consideration in that they are arguably often more willing to work with new ideas and forge new 
relations and directions (Laine, 2006).
46
  The environmental justice movement, for example, 
emphasizes the importance of actively fostering new leadership able to work across a broad 
range of issues and engage diverse constituencies.
47
   SEA researchers, in our view, need to not 
only use their “research findings to inform the next generation of managers through our 
teaching” (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007, p. 349, emphasis added) but also educate 
students as citizens, and assist civil society organizations with their own forms of engagement.  
While sympathetic to Adams and Petrella’s (2010) calls for greater university-business-civil 
society collaborations over new educational curriculum to foster “responsible leadership”, we 
contend that it is important not to lose sight of fundamentally different conceptualizations of the 
means and ends of such leadership.  The input of more “radical” academics and activists would, 
for example, help to surface social contradictions and structural inequalities that are often erased 
in mainstream discourse (Molisa et al., forthcoming).  As such it would arguably provide “the 
emotional stir up/unfreezing” and “cognitive dissonance” that can assist in fostering fundamental 
change (Adams and McNicholas, 2007; Adams and Whelan, 2009).    Rather than a process of 
consensual rational argumentation, we would argue that fundamental change requires something 
akin to a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) – a process which SEA has yet to address in depth (but see 
Bebbington et al., 2007b; Brown, 2009, for discussion of the transformative possibilities of 
dialogic engagement and the ways identities may be (re)shaped as new alternatives emerge in 
dialogic interaction).
48
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 Although also see Adams and Whelan (2009, p. 131) on the structural impediments that increasingly constrain 
critical research in academia and Tuttle and Dillard (2007) for a more general treatment of the closing of the 
accounting academy. 
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 The website of the Environmental Leadership Program, for example, notes that it seeks “to train a new generation 
of environmental leaders characterized by diversity, innovation, collaboration, and effective communications” with 
“the skills to work across difference”, http://www.elpnet.org/what-we-do. 
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 There are parallels here between agonistic conceptions of “identity as becoming” and McKinlay’s (2010) 
discussion on performativity and the politics of identity (see also Brown, 2010, pp. 488-91 and Pipan and 
Czarniawska, 2010 on the way accounting technologies can help ideas/identities travel). 
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 SEA and Critical Accountants.  SEA and critical accountants have often drawn bold lines 
around adversarial versus collaborative approaches to engagement. For example, critical 
accountants seek to develop oppositional spaces outside the mainstream and pressure decision 
makers through confrontation and taking the offensive.  Their emphasis is on developing 
dialectical awareness of, and support for, social conflicts and struggles, highlighting accounting’s 
role as an ideological weapon (e.g. Tinker et al., 1991; Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Cooper et 
al., 2005; Spence, 2009; Carter and Toms, 2010; Hanlon, 2010).  Critical accountants argue that 
those promoting “partnership” approaches with business are at serious risk of being co-opted due 
to their under-estimation of the explicit and implicit effects of unequal power relationships 
(Archel et al., 2011). Thus, where some “deep greens” see framing SEA issues and engagement 
in monetary terms as having subversive  “Trojan horse” potential to bring SEA values into the 
mainstream (Gray, 1992), others warn that business case capture may effectively keep the 
Trojans “inside the horse” (Spence, 2007, p. 875).  Progress occurs as new alternatives emerge 
out of this conflict and debate, not necessarily as a result of a resolution. Awareness of this 
expanded alternative set also reduces the risks of cooption, by making it more difficult for 
dominant hegemonic interests to “impose” their realities. 
 Some critical accountants are sceptical that SEA – as conceptualized within reformist politics 
– could ever pose a serious threat to capitalist relations (Puxty, 1991; Cooper, 1992; Shenkin and 
Coulson, 2007; Spence et al., 2010).  Social accountants, by contrast, privilege reformist 
traditions of social change (e.g. Gray et al., 1991; Gray, 1992; Bebbington et al., 1994; 
Bebbington, 1997; Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007).  Focusing on engagements with 
organizations and policymakers, they seek to distance themselves from “extremists” and provide 
“advice and suggestions” that are “enabling in a practical [rather than disruptive] sense” 
(Bebbington, 1997, p. 371).  Refusing to “get involved” in the name of resisting managerial 
capture is viewed as “an abdication of responsibility [with] judgement... then always exercised 
by others” (Bebbington and Gray, 2001, p. 583 citing Bronner, 1994).   
 Reminiscent of the “Death” debates, some object to the “conflict-based” notion of capture 
itself, on the grounds that it implies ownership rights over SEA and “confines reason to some 
academic elite who pin all their hopes on some future revolution” (Adams and Larrinaga-
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González, 2007, p. 338; see also Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010, p. 831 accusing those following 
the critical path of watching “the funeral pyre smouldering”).  To reformists, critical theory too 
often appears to be a “purely intellectual” and negative exercise (Bokeno, 2003, p. 604).  Even 
when praxis is attempted, critical theorists are charged with talking at people rather than with 
people (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007, p. 342) and their conflict orientation is seen to 
needlessly antagonize those who might otherwise be sympathetic (Gray et al., 1991).  We believe 
there is validity in both positions, and agonistic pluralism would advocate processes whereby 
debate between these groups would be facilitated, not ameliorated.  Contrary to more 
consensually-oriented deliberative approaches, we would emphasise that the ability to 
problematize and “disrupt” the status quo is a core democratic value (Norval, 2007). 
 As noted in our introduction, at least some areas of SEA now enjoy symbiotic relations with 
critical theorists (Gray, 2002b, p. 377; Tinker and Gray, 2003), with writers acknowledging the 
need to develop SEA’s theoretical base and to become more politically aware.49  We encourage 
more (ant)agonistic political relations between these two groups (and their equivalent 
communities in the wider polity), in accordance with our view that social and political 
transformation involves a combination of “inside” and “outside” perspectives.  Agonistic 
pluralism conceptualizes politics “as a ‘mixed-game,’ i.e., in part collaborative and in part 
conflictual” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 756).  Too much diversity can be problematic, for example, the 
oft-noted fracturing of the Left.  At the same time, disagreement and lack of consensus should 
not be regarded as signs of failure or betrayal.  To the contrary, learning to engage difference can 
not only “yield better mutual understanding… and the agreement to disagree” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 
108), but also help in building progressive alliances across different social movements and 
resisting neo-liberal ideologies that posit an already existing harmony of interests between 
dominant  and subordinate groups.  Conflicts can be “fruitful and educative”, with different 
perspectives bringing out limits in others (ibid., p. 98) and allowing debate over what “the good 
life” and the “pursuit of happiness” means (cf Adams and Whelan, 2009).  Again, these debates 
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 See, for example, Gray’s (2006, p. 812) “confessional… that until nearly ten years ago I clearly and firmly fell 
into this [reformist] camp” but that “I no longer believe that a comfortable, reformist agenda will be sufficient or 
even possible.”   
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provide the possibility for new alternatives to emerge, enhancing the opportunities to challenge 
dominant discourses. 
 Agonistic democrats look for broad progressive coalitions based on commonalities in 
ideological perspectives.  This may include forging loose “unlikely alliances” or “novel 
partnerships” with those that would normally be regarded as adversaries (Cohen, 2006, p. 75) on 
some issues (e.g. tempered radicals
50
 and militant activists; Republicans with strong 
conservationist beliefs) and “employing a continuum of strategies to help effect social change, 
ranging from subtle quiet tactics to organizing collective action” (Ball, 2007, p. 762).  Such 
approaches recognize that the world is “a complex and nonlinear system in which small 
interventions can have huge impact” (Schmitt, 2005a).  Different groups are free to return to the 
offensive in areas of disagreement. As Little (2005b) explains, the goal “is not to create 
frictionless coalitions, but constructive controversy” and to “compel opponents...  to justify their 
positions” and thereby push debates further. Thus, in (ant)agonistic politics, traditional 
distinctions in critical theory between “reform” and “revolution” become blurred (Brown, 2009, 
p. 323).
51
  
 Theorizing adversarialism.  We contend that agonistic pluralism helps theorize empirical 
settings in a way that fosters engagement beyond the “business case”.  Here we draw on Archel 
et al.’s (2011) empirical study of government-led CSR initiatives in Spain to briefly illustrate 
how overt and latent antagonisms might be surfaced and, potentially, constructively engaged in 
attempts to transform the status quo.  Archel et al.’s (2011) study illustrates the imposition of the 
dominant business discourse through “dialogue” and “stakeholder engagement” processes.  
Diverse engagement processes were in place and a variety of ideological perspectives were 
initially evident, but over the life of the project, discursive diversity disappeared as it was 
progressively “filtered through various stakeholder dialogue processes” directed toward gaining 
consensus and “re-emerged advocating voluntarism and business-as-usual” (Archel et al., 2011, 
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 A tempered radical is “non-revolutionary and works incrementally to create change” and, inter alia, looks for “the 
potential for change in commonplace situations and seemingly mundane actions” (Ball, 2007, p. 762-63). 
51
  See also Spence et al. (2010, p. 78) noting that both reform and revolution lead in different ways to the “death of 
politics”. 
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p. 328) as evidenced by the CSR reporting requirements, or lack thereof, that favored the 
dominant elites (business).  Some groups offering more radical alternatives withdrew from the 
process early on recognizing the futility of wielding any influence and not wishing to validate 
what they perceived as a flawed process, while others showed signs of being co-opted by the 
process itself and began to (re)frame their positions in accordance with the “logic” of the 
dominant discourse.    
 Agonistic pluralism recognizes that antagonisms, collective identifications and passions are 
all important elements in democratic politics.  As discussed earlier, an SEA that fosters pluralism 
by providing visibility to hegemonies and counter-hegemonies and recognizes the value of 
political relations that embrace ongoing tension between consensus and conflict provides a 
promising avenue for progressive change.  This perspective contrasts with extant SEA literature 
that generally downplays difference, conflict and dissent and is more likely to be framed from a 
business rather than civil society perspective as evidenced by the dominance of the “business 
case” approach to SEA.  As the antithesis of consensus-based, business dominated “stakeholder 
engagement” discourses reported by Archel et al. (2011), agonistic pluralism facilitates 
polylogics by highlighting conflict and fostering oppositional communities.  Agonistic pluralism 
and the associated SEAs (e.g. counter-accountings) recognize that dialogue is itself highly 
political.   
 The issues identified from our analysis of the “Death” debates appear to be relevant in the 
circumstances reported by Archel et al. (2011).  First, the political and ideological foundations of 
various discourses and related groups were not explicitly recognized.  The dominant discourse of 
neoclassical cost benefit (value added) analysis, shareholder value enhancement, and customer 
satisfaction provided the institutional framework whereby entry and relevance were determined.  
Technical reasoning and quantitative representations were privileged, subordinating alternative, 
more subjective, logics.  The political nature of the debate was obscured, masking the power 
relations influencing the outcome.  Second, not having recognized the political nature of the 
various interests, the institutional processes needed to facilitate the presentation of the alternative 
views, values and visions of various groups – and, in particular, enable less powerful voices - 
were either not developed or implemented or, if they were, lost traction in the “unfriendly” wider 
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environment.  Dominant elites thus had little reason to take alternatives seriously.  Third, to 
develop and implement the changes called for by Archel et al. (2011), a progressive pluralistic, 
democratic politics needs to nurture the institutional and non-institutional settings necessary to 
effectively articulate and operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda.  These 
must recognize the benefit of both consensus and dissensus through (ant)agonistic relationships 
among interested groups.  The tenets of agonistic pluralism help in theorizing how to move 
toward polylogic engagement, without glossing over the significant challenges this entails. 
Briefly, Brown (2009, pp. 324-28) proposes eight critical dialogic principles derived from 
agonistic pluralism that, if applied, might have partially mitigated, or at least shed light on, the 
business capture of both the institutional processes as well as the outcomes in the Spanish case 
analyzed by Archel et al. (2011).
52
  The central assumption of this approach is that there are 
fundamental conflicting ideological perspectives among the interested parties that cannot be 
resolved and that the suspension of asymmetric power is a practical impossibility.  In an attempt 
to apply agonistic pluralism to overcome discourse capture by dominant groups, one way to 
proceed might be to spell out the eight principles as part of the preliminary agenda for 
establishing processes by which policy alternatives are developed, implemented and evaluated.  
Multiple ideological orientations would be identified and explicitly recognized (e.g., neoliberal 
markets-based approaches versus those based on the socio-political perspectives of human rights, 
labour, feminist and environmental movements).  The implications of reductionist 
representations, especially quantitative data, on the scope and depth of the debates would be 
acknowledged with appreciation of the contestable nature of the “facts”.   For example, the 
contestability of inputs to neo-liberal cost benefit analysis would be recognized and various 
counter-accounts (including alternative quantitative representations, qualitative and visual data) 
provided by what Archel et al. (2011) refer to as “heretic” groups.  There would be explicit and 
multiple processes to enable and ensure that non-experts have access to the deliberations, both 
discursively and intellectually.  This can be facilitated by forging “chains of equivalence” among 
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  These principles are as follows: recognize multiple ideological orientations; avoid monetary reductionism; be 
open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations; enable non-expert accessibility; ensure effective 
participatory processes; highlight extant power relationships; recognize the transformative potential of dialogic 
accounting; and resist new forms of monologism.   
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groups contesting particular forms of subordination (e.g. labor, indigenous peoples, ethnic, 
gender, sexual orientation, race) with care taken “not to gloss over differences” and “to resist any 
temptation for one group to ‘absorb’ the other” (Brown, 2009, p. 334).  Purcell (2009, p. 159) 
points to the example of the anti-globalization movement which has: 
involved a range of groups (e.g. labor, environmentalists, anti-third-world debt, human rights in China, etc.) that 
shared an equivalent opposition to the globalization of neoliberalism. Their concerns were in many ways 
disparate (outsourcing of jobs, sea turtles, rediscovering jubilee obligations, the occupation of Tibet, etc.), but 
they strategically defined themselves as equivalent and acted together to oppose the WTO and other institutions 
committed to neoliberalization... Each member of the coalition achieved much more than they could have alone, 
but they did not have to dissolve into a large and uniform collective to do it. While they did not achieve the end 
of neoliberal hegemony, they certainly succeeded in identifying it and calling it into question. 
 
 Institutional and non-institutional processes should help ensure effective participation spaces 
and processes.  At the institutional level, this requires broader structural change, for example, the 
establishment of legislative rights to information and participation, with civil society groups 
aware that this will involve conscious political mobilization (Dannin, 2006). Equally, if not more 
importantly,  counter-hegemonic groups need to develop oppositional communities – separate 
spaces outside existing institutions where they can explore and advance alternative 
understandings that contest existing exclusions, especially ones perceived as unimportant, 
inchoate, illegitimate or unimaginable from dominant perspectives (Kohn, 2000, p. 424).
 
 The 
aim here is not "permanent balkanization, but rather a temporary retreat to a protected space in 
which it is possible to explore and test genuinely alternative ways of framing collective 
problems” (ibid.).  This is key in developing the kind of resignifying that Archel et al. (2011, p. 
341), in our view, rightly recognize as vital in efforts to resist voluntarist, consensually-oriented 
understandings of CSR and to establish new signifiers less likely to float to business positions.   
In the absence of an institutional environment conducive to the expression and implementation 
of genuine alternatives, counter-hegemonic movements arguably would rationally exercise their 
right not to participate in corporate and State-initiated stakeholder “dialogue”.   Lastly, there 
must be a resistance to establishing new forms of monologism that, however well-intentioned, 
aim to guide people to new universalistic answers that, in our view, unrealistically and ill-
advisedly imply an “end to politics”. 
 It may be argued that mainstream business/accounting adheres to democratic values in that it 
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accepts the legitimacy of stakeholder engagement.  Archel et al.’s (2011) findings show that 
when implemented within and filtered through prevailing dominant “business case” institutional 
processes, embracing stakeholder engagement legitimates business interests’ hegemonic position 
(i.e. shareholder wealth maximization).   In these conditions, power elites do not find it 
particularly confronting to at least listen to “heretic” discourses; indeed, by doing so, they may 
help to legitimate their own “business case” approach as the “consensual” outcome of dialogue.  
The fundamental norms of neoliberal practices (e.g. questioning of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm) are thus never seriously questioned.  Application of Brown’s (2009) 
principles would require recognition of legitimate contestation over both the fundamental norms 
that underpin our institutions (e.g. efficiency, social justice, accountability) and how they are or 
should be interpreted, prioritized and put into practice.   Here, again, we see the fostering of 
oppositional communities that can build the social capital to help map out alternatives and 
experiment with innovative counter-accountings and practices as key.   The social movements 
and communicative planning literatures provide examples of agonistic approaches that can be 
applied at the local level.  The following is an example of a river cleanup project that illustrates 
these principles in operation: 
a coalition of environmental, neighborhood, Native American, small business, and environmental justice groups 
[DRCC] has come together to advocate for greater popular empowerment... The cleanup is being overseen by 
a… neoliberal governance arrangement: a public–private partnership (PPP) among major polluters has been 
given wide authority to study, plan, and carry out the cleanup. While the PPP’s agenda is diverse, at its base is a 
vision of the river as a waterway and its banks as marketable property. The watershed… must meet the needs of 
the economy. The DRCC brings together groups with quite disparate interests. But they share an equivalent 
opposition to the PPP’s waterway/property vision; they see the watershed instead as inhabited, by residents, by 
native tribes, by fish and wildlife. The diverse elements of the DRCC have… consciously constructed together 
an equivalent vision for the river. They see that vision to be irreducibly different from that of the PPP, and… 
they understand their relations with the PPP to be agonistic. That is, they see the PPP as an adversary with whom 
they must struggle, not a partner with whom to build a cooperative solution through communicative action. I 
don’t mean they never cooperate, never communicate, and always protest. They use a range of political practices. 
Rather I mean in the big picture they believe they want something fundamentally different from the PPP. While 
there may be ample room for negotiation and strategic compromise along the way, in the long term an inhabited 
watershed is very different from and in many ways incompatible with an owned watershed. Currently, the PPP’s 
owned-watershed vision is hegemonic. The river is seen as first and foremost as a waterway that serves the needs 
of the economy. The DRCC struggles agonistically to supplant that hegemonic vision with a counter-hegemonic 
vision of the river as inhabited… While they have not yet transformed the relations of power that govern 
Superfund cleanups, they have been able to make promising inroads: to exploit existing opportunities (and invent 
new ones) to call into question neoliberal governance structures and values, and to significantly empower non-
owner interests to advance a distinctly different idea of what the watershed should be (Purcell, 2009, p. 160). 
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As illustrated by this and the anti-globalization example, counter-hegemonic movements do 
not aim to eliminate power but rather to reclaim it “through political mobilization” (ibid.). 
Against neoliberal conceptions “of property rights and rights to accumulation”, they construct 
and assert divergent demands, namely “to inhabit urban space, to maximize use-value rather than 
exchange value, and to play a central role in decision-making” (ibid.).  As Purcell (2009, p. 160) 
observes “such movements, though nascent, are proliferating”.  They are finding creative ways 
of resisting neoliberalism and help to illustrate that other worlds are possible (ibid; see also 
Cooper 2001 discussing the importance of oppositional communities that both map and act out 
new possible social pathways).  We consider there is significant potential for the SEA 
community to join with academics and groups developing agonistic practices in communicative 
planning, development studies and political theory (e.g. see Bond, 2011; Hillier, 2002; Kapoor, 
2008; Purcell, 2009).  SEA has much to learn from these endeavours in trying to create more 
democratic and just societies and, equally, polylogic approaches to accounting offer much in 
helping to foster counter-hegemonic movements and agonistic political relations.
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4.  Closing comments 
SEA, and the environmental movement in general, is currently going through a period of  critical 
self-analysis.  As part of this debate, challenging questions have been raised about how SEA 
should be defined, who should be doing the defining, and what its agenda should be.  Should 
managerialist forms of SEA engagement be classified as “real” SEA?54  Can we speak of an 
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 The value of dialogic accounting has recently been recognized in the communicative planning literature.  Healey 
and Hillier (2010, p. 387) advocate “consideration of [the] concept of dialogic accounting…. Such accounting is not 
concerned with discovery of an ‘infallible truth’, but rather with discussing actants’ values and priorities in 
‘democratic’ processes of decision making…. Who gets to discuss these values and priorities in what type of 
‘democratic’ setting, however, poses yet another ethical issue”. 
54
 The “boundaries” of SEA research are highly political.  For example, decisions to exclude “accounting and labour 
relations” literature in many SEA reviews have arguably helped to privilege the “environmental” in “social and 
environmental accounting”.  From the perspective of progressive politics, it is difficult to understand why this work 
(and, even more so, critical accounting) is excluded from social accounting “as the universe of all possible 
accountings” (see Gray, 2002a, p. 692 and p. 694 where Gray calls for more attention to the labour context), while 
managerialist SEA that relies on “the functionalist toolbox” or “professional accounting orthodoxy” is often treated 
as “real SEA” (ibid., p. 693).  This perhaps goes some way to explaining why researchers themselves are divided 
over whether they even want to be counted as SEA researchers, with many academics of a more critical bent 
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“SEA project” or “community”?  What, if any, values or objectives unite those who work in this 
area?  Should we describe ourselves primarily in disciplinary terms (e.g. as a field of study) or in 
terms of our politics (e.g. as a movement)?  Why does SEA matter?  What, if anything, has it 
achieved?  How should we define and/or measure “success” and over what time frame?  With 
whom should we engage to achieve change?  How should we react to methodological and/or 
political diversity?  Should we strive for more cohesion and unity of purpose? Or embrace 
pluralism and heterodoxy? 
 The “Death” debates strongly resonate with the current contestable terrain of SEA (and 
progressive social movements in general) and, as such, represent the context and content of the 
political space associated with programs for engagement  The problems, proposed solutions, and 
criticisms discussed above identify contestable issues as well as suggest the diverse array of 
interested constituencies.  While the impossibility of an accounting that transcends values and 
politics is recognized in SEA, the relevance and influence of contested values and ideologies in 
developing and understanding SEA has not been fully appreciated.  We submit that SEA has 
much to gain from engaging with the interrelations of the social, environmental, and economic 
domains in a more critically pluralistic fashion.  Doing so requires, inter alia, the re-evaluation 
and extension of traditional boundaries of what constitutes the environment and engagement and 
giving greater visibility to the contested politics inextricably bound up with technical practices 
such as accounting.  Integrating the social and political with the technical in a way that respects 
our diversity as socio-political beings requires active engagement among experts, business, 
policymakers, social movements and citizens.  While a number of SEA researchers to date have 
initiated dialogue with business groups and policy elites, we see a pressing need to also engage 
social movements to formulate positions and accountings that move beyond the business case for 
SEA.  Moreover, rather than positing social movements as a relatively homogenous group with 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferring to eschew the SEA label (Gray et al., 2009, p. 567; see also Owen, 2008, pp. 240-42 for discussion of the 
politics of defining SEA research).  
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common information needs, the “Death” debates highlight important distinctions between those 
operating in collaborative and adversarial modes. Adversarial NGOs, for example, might have 
greater call for various forms of counter-accounting and oppositional analysis. 
 In keeping with a commitment to agonistic praxis (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; 
Dillard and Brown, 2012), our analysis has identified some of the issues that motivate tensions 
between the more pragmatic and critical arms of the SEA field (and social movements more 
generally).  We propose agonistic pluralism as a basis for developing engagement strategies and 
programs when interacting with groups with diverse views, values, and visions.  We 
acknowledge that this approach brings with it a host of difficult and, as yet, unanswered issues – 
in particular those surrounding the need to develop more polylogic understandings of SEA and 
the requisite supporting ethics and information systems (see Brown, 2009 and  Dillard and 
Roslender, 2011 for some starting thoughts).  However, here we would emphasise that ideas 
regarding critical pluralistic praxis are gaining increasing currency in many other disciplines and 
provide a substantial and, as yet, largely untapped resource for developing “critical” SEA.55 
 While social change may reasonably be argued to involve some combination of working both 
“within” and “outside” the system, in collaborative and combative ways, it is acknowledged that 
many will find the pluralistic approach proposed here too “messy” and challenge it as bringing 
its own serious political risks.  Letting “different worldviews bloom” may seem unduly 
relativistic, even nihilistic to some (cf Kysar, 2008, p. 2074ff).  We have given our reasons for 
concluding otherwise, but in the spirit of agonistic pluralism, we welcome further debate on this 
and other issues raised.  It is hoped that these ideas will help stimulate empirical projects that 
explore polyvocality while retaining a critical edge (see Archel et al. 2011; see also Goi, 2005; 
Huijer, 2005; Purcell, 2009; McClymont, 2011 for cognate work in other disciplines).  In the 
interests of re-activating “the political” and what many see as an ailing civic sphere (O’Leary, 
1985; Cooper et al., 2005; Lehman, 2001, 2011; Spence et al., 2010), it is our contention that 
SEA engagement debates need to take place not just among academics, and political, business or 
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 In addition to our earlier examples, we would point to considerable possibilities for the cross-fertilisation of ideas 
across, inter alia, pluralist political theory, science and technology studies, heterodox economics, interpretive policy 
analysis, participatory development studies, and critical information systems. 
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NGO “leaders”, but also in the wider communities to which we all belong.  In this sense, we 
present this discussion as one strand of a much larger set of conversations among “friendly 
enemies” (cf Brown, 2009, p. 321).  Our overall aim is not to suggest that we have “the 
answers”, but rather to promote dialogue and debate among various groups with an interest in 
conceptualizing and undertaking meaningful engagements.  Notwithstanding our differences 
over the wisdom of an organizational-centred approach, we wholeheartedly agree with Adams 
and Larrinaga-González (2007, p. 349) that SEA has barely scratched the surface of the 
potentialities of engagement research.  We hope that our discussion helps to open up new 
possibilities that enable SEA to effectively respond to, and move beyond, traditional politically 
conservative, managerialist approaches to sustainability.   We seek to provide food for thought 
not just for constituencies already strongly aligned with particular political positions but also 
those who are relative newcomers to the debates. 
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Table 1.  Summary of the “Death of Environmentalism” debates 
Key 
Themes 
Technocratic approach to 
concerns, knowledge, and 
politics  (facts over 
values) 
Failure to articulate 
comprehensive views, 
alternative values, and 
inspiring vision (short 
term policy over long 
term politics) 
Failure to build effective 
progressive alliances and 
public support (special 
interest over public 
interest) 
 
The issues - assume that scientific 
facts will motivate desired 
change 
- interrelated problems 
presented as discrete policy 
issues with technical 
solutions (reductionist, 
single issue framework) 
- failure to articulate an 
adequate political vision 
because of the technocratic 
perspective 
- focus on short term policy  
rather than long term 
political payoffs 
- environmentalism has 
become another narrowly 
defined special interest 
group 
- overly pragmatic and 
incrementalist approach 
- missed opportunities to 
build effective and necessary 
progressive alliances with 
“interested” groups 
- too disconnected from, and 
condescending toward, lay 
people (failing to enrol them 
as allies) 
 
The 
reapers’ 
proposed 
solutions 
- get out of technical policy 
mindset and eschew any 
idea of a politically neutral 
approach to 
environmentalism 
- be open to the relevance 
and influence of values and 
ideologies 
- move away from “binary 
thinking” to an emphasis 
on interconnectedness and 
interdependence 
- “truth” is socially 
constructed and contestable 
- problematize traditional 
analytical boundaries of 
“environmental” issues 
- recognize the “culture 
war” requires a new 
politics grounded in a set 
of core values and a 
common vision 
- focus on the politics of 
framing 
- provide a more expansive, 
inclusive, and compelling 
vision 
- create new language, new 
strategic initiatives, new 
sets of institutions, and 
new metrics for evaluating 
success 
- connect honestly and 
respectfully with people’s 
everyday lives 
- set up political conflicts 
and controversy on terms 
- invest heavily in building 
broad-based coalitions based 
on shared values and 
political vision 
- inject vision and values 
into contested political 
spaces, forcing politicians 
and others  to take sides 
- frame issues consistent 
with the political worldviews 
of progressive communities 
- conceptualize the “new 
energy economy” as win/win 
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that advance the 
environmental movement’s 
transformative values and 
vision 
Counter-
critique  
- inability to adequately 
integrate the technical and 
the socio-political 
- do not appreciate the 
complexity and nuance of 
the problem 
- assumes a unity of 
perspective with regards to 
core progressive values 
which is not present 
- unwillingness to consult 
international movements or 
their histories 
- take an elitist, expert, 
privileged approach 
- do not frame 
environmental issues in 
relation to economic, 
social, and cultural 
(in)justices (distributional 
issues) or across race, 
ethnic, social class, gender, 
age and/or geographic lines 
- the distinction between 
“human” and “nature” is 
important in distinguishing 
permissible human 
activities  
- views are too narrow and 
still grounded in 
traditional, incrementalist 
rationality and positivist 
perspectives 
- ignore alternatives 
adopted by other social 
movements 
- represent an elitist, North 
American, male 
perspective with 
professionals/consultants 
being the arbiter of 
progressive values leading 
to a lack of democracy 
- does not adequately 
address structural issues 
and impediments 
- social marketing is used 
to manipulate perspectives 
- “value” and “better” 
become relativistic 
- scientific rationality 
should not be abandoned  
- propose a conservative, 
third-way strategy 
- have much to learn about 
building broad-based 
political alliances from 
other, more experienced 
grassroots movements 
- elicits attitudes that cannot 
gain the necessary broad-
based political support 
- proposed enhanced value 
set still inadequate for 
building broad-based public 
support 
- privilege the role of elites 
over ordinary citizens 
- do not adequately 
recognize the need to build 
the necessary social wealth 
for adequate broad- based 
political engagement and 
commitment 
- inadequate attention is 
given to privileges, diversity, 
interdependency, and 
distribution of wealth 
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